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This dissertation examines two prominent macroeconomic models and their behavioral un-
derpinnings in a laboratory setting. The first is that of state-dependent pricing models (i.e.,
“menu cost” models). Comparisons were made between laboratory results and a computer-
simulated optimal behavior, and results indicate that subjects update prices too frequently
resulting in statistically suboptimal profits due to subjects’ inability to clearly ascertain the
optimal threshold at which to update prices. Second, the consumption predictions made
under rational inattention theory were examined via a laboratory experiment. Results indi-
cate that subjects’ behavior aligns well with predictions in that they consume stochastically,
yet adjust their consumption and attention according to variations in the economic envi-
ronment. Subjects also respond more quickly and in higher magnitude to negative income
shocks compared to positive. Finally, the experiments provided two use cases that enabled
the evaluation of how coding environments and demands on versatility of laboratory of ex-
periments have evolved. Performance comparisons were made between two novel coding
environments and the most commonly used experimental platform, z-Tree. Results indicate
that while environments other than z-Tree o er substantially more flexibility and perfor-
mance enhancements, these benefits can come at the cost of nontrivial software engineering
resources.
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Introduction
The purpose of this body of work is to explore the microeconomic, or behavioral, un-
derpinnings for two prominent macroeconomic models through the use of laboratory exper-
iments. Further, this body of work links the work done herein back to the literation from
an evaluation perspective with respect to resources required to develop said experiments –
whether those resources be computational, time investment, or otherwise.
Chapter 1 articulates the formulation of an experiment to seeking to understand to what
degree human subjects exhibit “state dependence” and the results found from implementing
such an experiment. State dependent pricing models are commonly used in macroeconomics
to understand the rigidity in price movements, but very little research has been done as to
how closely the assumptions embedded in the model reflect human behavior. The experi-
ment was devised to extend what had already been done in the literature to a more robust
environment.
Chapter 2 examines to what degree consumers behave according to predictions made by
the theory of the rational inattentive consumer. Again, an experiment was devised to test
hypotheses derived from the rational inattention model that predicts distinct behaviors that
changes in the economic environment would elicit from consumers.
Chapter 3 draws from the learnings from the first two chapters and considers the status of
laboratory experiments in the context of a world that increasingly demands more function-
ality and robustness out of its experiments. Similar to how the field of economics as a whole
has had to adapt to using computational methods to solve increasingly complex models,
experimentalists are finding themselves having to move away from conventional methods of
creating and implementing experiments due to the level of sophistication of hypotheses being
tested. In this chapter, learnings from coding two custom environments are presented, and
tradeo s between three very common coding environments are presented to help researchers
understand what environment might be best for their use case.
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Chapter 1: State-Dependent Price Setting: An Experiment
1 Introduction
How firms make their pricing decisions is a fundamental question of macroeconomics. The
degree of price rigidity is commonly considered the main factor a ecting the transmission
of monetary policy to the real economy and, not surprisingly, an extensive literature has
explored this matter over the years. A growing body of empirical work has tried to quantify
the degree of flexibility of prices. The most recent empirical evidence seems to unanimously
support the conclusion that price adjustments occur at higher frequencies than initially
believed (see, for instance, Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2007; Bils
and Klenow, 2004, who find durations between four and eight months). At the same time,
many competing theories have been proposed to provide a micro-foundation of price rigidity
and embed it in macroeconomic models, from the more simple staggered price model of Calvo
(1983) to the menu costs of Mankiw (1985) and the state dependent models (also known
as “Ss”) introduced by Caplin and Leahy (1991). With so many alternative models still
actively used in the theoretical work, economists seek to understand the intrinsic validity of
the assumptions required by each, and controlled laboratory experiments provide a useful
tool for doing so. In this paper, we investigate price rigidities relying on a fully experimental
context. The purpose of our work is demonstrating to what extent a state dependent optimal
pricing model has a legitimate behavioral basis.
Ss models hold at their core that agents should choose when to re-optimize solely based
the state of the world (“state-dependent” adjustment) and not on time per se (i.e., “time-
dependent” adjustment). In our experiment, we follow the approach of Magnani et al.
(2015) to setup an experimental environment in which the subjects must adopt a state
dependent pricing rule in order to maximize the profits of their production activity. The
profits earned by the subjects are deleteriously a ected by the deviation of the price charged
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at a point in time from an optimal reference price, which depends on the underlying economic
fundamentals. Prices can be reset to the optimal price at any time, but the subjects face an
adjustment cost that determines the standard optimal threshold for price adjustments of the
Ss models. We depart from Magnani et al. (2015)’s design in how we model the adjustment
cost, which entails two fundamental di erences with respect to their basic framework. First,
in our experiment subjects must complete a real e ort task in order to produce a unit of
output and make profits. Second, the subjects must complete a time-consuming task in
order to adjust the price they charge, thereby foregoing profits to do so. As a result of the
introduction of these two tasks, the cost of updating in our model reflects a real trade-o 
between production and price setting, and it is not exogenously given to the subjects as in
Magnani et al. (2015). The trade-o  relies on the perception of time cost of the subjects,
which is an individual specific cost. By internalizing the updating cost and examining how
this a ects subjects’ behavior, we are able to highlight a new dimension of the inability of
price setters to accurately solve the problem facing them, which does not seem strictly related
to economic uncertainty per se. This new dimension of the analysis provides additional
insights on the role of attention and cognitive load in the price setting mechanism.
The main results of the experiment are essentially twofold. First, we find that subjects
tend to respond in a way that is akin to state dependence. In each of the situations we exam-
ine, the average subject exhibits behavior consistent with the employment of a noisy decision
rule for a threshold. They recognize the importance of an inaction region across treatments,
although the precision of these regions is lower the higher the degree of uncertainty in the
economy, and they exhibit some elements of time dependence in their pricing decisions. This
first result is in line with the evidence documented by Magnani et al. (2015), who explain
the large deviations of the subjects’ decisions from the optimal thresholds with a model of
bounded rationality. In their model, the limitations to rationality increase as a function
of the cognitive load fundamentally caused by the volatility of the economic environment
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in which subjects find themselves operating. Second, subjects in our experiment make an
additional systematic error in the identification of the optimal thresholds due to our implicit
adjustment cost. Comparing the experimental results to the optimal thresholds obtained
by simulation of the profit-maximizing decision rules that a fully rational agent should have
followed, we find that subjects adjust their prices too “early” with respect to the state, in
the sense that they reset prices when the profit from a unit of output sold is still higher
than the optimal threshold point. Since this type of error does not seem to depend on the
uncertainty of the environment, we link it to the form of the adjustment cost used in our
experiment.
The results obtained from the experiment suggest that a state dependent model is insuf-
ficient to fully capture the price setting behavior. Rather, an hybrid model that mixes, at
the same time, state and time dependent elements would be necessary to adequately fit the
data from the laboratory. Similar conclusions were suggested by the analysis of field data as
well; for instance, Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) show
that the shape of the hazard functions of price adjustments in field microdata is not directly
attributable to simple menu-cost models. Also Magnani et al. (2015) conclude that bounded
rationality is the most plausible explanation of this hybrid dynamics of pricing decisions
given their experimental setup. Subjects experience cognitive costs in assessing the state
of the economy and formulating their optimal response, and higher cognitive loads decrease
subjects ability to fully adopt state dependent rules by increasing these costs. While there
are some exceptions, most studies have found negative e ects of cognitive load on basic
economic behavior (see Deck and Jahedi, 2015, for a recent survey).
We further explore this type of explanation with the introduction of the trade-o  between
production and price setting tasks. The purpose of this feature of our design is to have a
simple and direct way to tamper with the cognitive capacity of the subjects; if the cognitive
load explanation is valid, this additional burden should negatively a ect the performance of
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subject across treatments. The implicit cost of adjustment achieves this goal in two ways:
the first is by forcing subjects to infer their cost of resetting prices in terms of forgone
profits while they accomplish the updating task; the second is by adding a real source
of distraction for the subjects that diverts their attention from screening the state of the
economy to executing the production task. While it is hard to precisely disentangle the two
channels, they both operate in the same direction by increasing the likelihood of optimization
errors. This implicit trade-o  provides a simple micro-foundation of the attention allocation
mechanism in the laboratory, but it can be considered fairly realistic for a large group of firms
in which one or only very few workers are employed. The Small Business Administration
(SBA), for instance, reports that over 75% of businesses in the US have no employees.
Hence for most companies, pricing, production, and other tasks likely fall to a single person.
Whilst experimentally adequate in general, this trade-o  would be clearly much less realistic
for larger and more sophisticated enterprises in which separate divisions are in charge of
production and pricing decisions. However, other distracting factors would likely impact the
pricing divisions of larger firms and hence our experimental set-up likely has relevance for
them as well.
The e ect of the endogenous cost of adjusting prices is a uniform shift of thresholds across
decision environments. Sellers, pressured to actively engage in production, seem to system-
atically underestimate the actual cost they must bare to update prices, and as a consequence
they end up updating relatively more often than optimal. This behavioral pattern can be
explained in two ways. First, the literature on cognitive load (Deck and Jahedi, 2015) has
demonstrated that higher cognitive load leads people to be more impatient; subjects update
more often in the short period in the experiment. Second, this pattern is also suggestive
of models, as for instance rational inattention, in which information processing limitations
trigger decisions about attention allocation. Intuitively, subjects focus more attention on
production which, given a limited processing capacity, leads them to acquire a worse esti-
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mate (signal) of their implicit costs. Finally, our experimental results o er some guidance
also in interpreting some of the empirical evidence on price changes. Specifically, two ob-
servations are worth mentioning. First, the flat hazard rates found for the experimental
updating decisions suggest that models with constant probability of updating, such as the
Calvo pricing, might still have some practical utility in approximating the observed price
changes in spite of the oversimplified mechanism of price setting they embed. Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008) find that flat hazard rates are typical with field data as well. The second ob-
servation is that the large di erences in price change frequencies across sectors documented
by both Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) could find at
least a partial explanation in our price setting trade-o  mechanism. Price durations in the
field could reflect the interaction between the price setting activity and other phases of the
production and commercialization of a good.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the relation between
this paper and the literature in detail. Section 3 describes a simple theoretical model that
provides us with some qualitative predictions on the relative movements of observations from
treatment to treatment. In Section 4, we discuss the experimental design and implementa-
tion, and in Section 5 we present and discuss the results. Finally, in Section 6 we o er some
discussion of our findings and some ideas for potential future work.
2 Related Literature
Given the complexity of bringing macroeconomic models into a laboratory setting, it
is not especially common to use experiments to examine these models. With regard to
price rigidity specifically, there is a particular gap in the literature. To the best of our
knowledge, the only paper currently examining these issues is Magnani et al. (2015), who
devise an experiment to test a state dependent pricing model. They find that adjustment
distributions in the laboratory closely resembled field data, and that mean switching behavior
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obeyed comparative static predictions, on average. In their paper, subjects face only a simple
price adjustment task in which they must incur a fixed adjustment cost in order to reset
the current price to the observable “optimal price.” We extend their framework by including
real production and price updating tasks, which allows us to define an adjustment cost that
reflects the implicit trade-o  between the two tasks. This new mechanism negatively a ects
the decision process of the price setters by exposing the subjects to an increased cognitive
load; in response to that, subjects systematically over-update.
The interpretation of our results is closely related to the literature on the negative e ects
of cognitive load on people’s economic decisions. Kahneman (2002, 2011) develops a dual
system model of behavior.1 In this framework, people have both an impulsive system (System
1) and a deliberate reasoning system (System 2). When faced with a choice, System 1 quickly
arrives at a choice, which System 2 can override if brought to bear. However, when a person
is placed under cognitive load, the ability of System 2 to counteract System 1 is reduced.
Psychologists have recognized that people have limited cognitive resources since at least
Miller (1956), who found that people can only hold seven items e ectively in short term
memory. As a result, much of the work on the negative e ects of cognitive load involves
examining choices people make while memorizing a 7 digit number. Using a within-subject
design, Deck and Jahedi (2015) demonstrate that those whose math performance is most
impacted by cognitive load are also the people who become more impatient and more risk
averse when under cognitive load. This pattern of behavior provides strong evidence in favor
of the dual system model. Relatedly, studies have found that people with high cognitive
ability are less risk averse and more patient (see, for example, Dohmen et al., 2010; Benjamin
et al., 2013).2 Thus, increasing cognitive load e ectively serves to reduce the cognitive ability
of the decision maker. In our setting, the heightened cognitive load could explain two of the
1Similar models have also been developed by Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and Mukherjee (2010).
2While cognitive load can be viewed as a state, cognitive ability is typically viewed as a trait.
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behavioral patterns that we observe. First, because cognitive load leads people to be more
impatient, they tend to update before they should. Second, because their cognitive ability
is reduced, they have di culty identifying a consistent threshold.
State dependent models are only one of the competing models of price rigidity currently in
use. The evolution of these models dates back to the simplest mechanism of fixed contract
durations, as proposed by Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980). Both these papers develop
rational expectation models wherein firms are locked into staggered contracts. Applying
the model, Taylor finds that contracts of three or four quarters would be enough to explain
unemployment rigidity. Staggered prices are introduced by Calvo (1983), which is considered
the fountainhead of the New Keynesian approach to modeling price rigidity. Even though
relatively more basic and stylized than a Ss model, this approach is still largely used in
modern macroeconomic models due to the convenient tractability it o ers. In his model,
only a fixed fraction of firms are exogenously chosen to update their prices in each period,
while the others are forced to keep the older price level. In a di erent approach, Mankiw
(1985) suggests that prices are sticky because of “menu” costs. That is — real, explicit costs
incurred by producers to update their prices. A firm observes the deviation of its current
price from the optimal price level, and it decides to update its price when the possible increase
in revenues from adjusting is higher than the explicit updating cost. State dependent models
can be considered a logical progression of these last two models. Our paper, similarly to
Magnani et al. (2015), shows that price setting fundamentally follows a state dependent
rule, even though it also exhibits traits attributable to time dependence and elements of
price rigidities typical of the Calvo pricing.
A parallel strand of the same literature unfolded around the relation between prices
and information in the economy. Hayek (1945) argues that prices are the means by which
economic changes are communicated across the entire economy to its various participants
through a market mechanism. As a consequence, more price flexibility would reflect improve-
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ments in the market communication system. Lucas (1973) pro ers a model that derives a
short-run Phillips Curve from the similar idea that prices convey noisy information about
the stance of the economy and producers demand. More recently, stickiness in information
propagation has been used by Mankiw and Reis (2002) to obtain sticky prices and inflation
persistence in a way alternative to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Finally, Sims (2003)
proposes a sophisticated model of price rigidities based on a limited information-processing
capacity of the price-setting agents. This mechanism, known as rational inattention, im-
proves on menu costs and Calvo/Ss models in that it can simultaneously generate the ob-
served micro flexibility together with su cient rigidity of prices on the macroeconomic level.
The essence of the rational inattention model was laid out in Matejka (2010). In his model,
firms face a large number of noisy signals about factors that a ect pricing decisions. How-
ever, they face a constraint on the total amount of attention that they may allocate over
these signals, so they must decide the signals on which they will focus. Even though we do
not explicitly explore the information channels in this paper, we identify an additional set
of errors in the pricing decisions which, as discussed above, can be interpreted in terms of
bounded rationality and the e ects of the reduction of subjects’ attention on the optimal
pricing due to the production activity.
Finally, our paper is related to the empirical literature that studies the characteristics
of price adjustments from a more micro perspective at firm level. The main conclusion
of this strand of literature is that prices are actually quite flexible and price adjustments
occur relatively often, with a median frequency largely below one year. Blinder et al. (1998)
surveys firm managers and concludes that prices change approximately only once per year;
similar evidence is provided by Carlton (1986), Cecchetti (1986), Kashyap (1995), Levy et al.
(1997), MacDonald and Aaronson (2001), and Kackmeister (2001). This was a commonly
held belief in the 1990’s until Bils and Klenow (2004) studied frequency of price changes in
350 categories of goods and services representing approximately 70% of consumer spending
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and found that half of them had median frequency of price adjustments of approximately 4.3
months, substantially shorter than that reported by Blinder et al. (1998). Also Nakamura
and Steinsson (2007) find that the typical price duration is below one year, around 7 ≠ 8
months for median price adjustments, and that there were not gigantic di erences across
regular prices from the time periods of 1988-1997 as compared to 1988-2005. For these
same periods, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) find qualitatively similar results for both posted
prices (i.e., raw BLS data) and regular prices.3 Our experiment confirms that price setters
understand and follow the right incentives to adjust prices relatively often, even in presence
of hard costs of re-adjusting due to foregone production and profits. In this respect, the
evidence we provide is broadly consistent with the conclusion that prices are indeed quite
flexible as suggested by the most recent empirical literature.
3 Theoretical Framework
We first present a stylized theoretical model to help provide a structure for understanding
the pricing decision faced by subjects in the experiment. As with Fischer (1977), Taylor
(1980), Calvo (1983), and others, this model is an abstraction from the underlying decision
making setting. That is, our research process began with the creation of an environment
that mimics the phenomenon in the naturally occurring world that we wanted to investigate
and then we constructed a model to forecast behavior. Thus, our experiment is not meant to
be a strict test of this model. The model is a state contingent pricing model in discrete time
in which a producer must make a decision on how to allocate time between the production
of one unit of a single good and a task to optimize the price at which the good is sold. Time
is the only input for both activities, and it takes one unit of time to produce one unit of
3Moreover, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) note that one of the primary issues that arise when assessing
price rigidity is whether to focus on the median or the mean of the price change and they stress that it is
also important to consider how one must account for “sales” (i.e., short-term reduction in prices, often used
to lure customers into the store).
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the good. The price setting task is time consuming, too; and it is also assumed to take one
unit of time.4 The producer, then, faces a trade o  between earning positive profits from the
current production or suspending production for one period to update the current price and
enjoy higher expected unit profits in the next period. The profit function,  t, is specified in
terms of the deviations of the optimal price, P út , from the current price, Pt, as
 t = exp[≠µ · |Xt|]
where Xt = Pt ≠ P út and µ > 0 is the parameter that regulates the rate of decay of profits.
Given this profit function, we can express the Bellman equation of the producer’s recursive
problem as
V (Xt) = maxut {(1 ≠ ut)  t + —Et (V [Xt+1 (Xt, ut, Át+1)])}
where u is a binary variable representing the decision of the producer to update the price
(u = 1) or produce in the current period (u = 0), and Á is a zero mean, i.i.d. exogenous
innovation to X. The optimal price level P út drifts away from current price Pt. The price
deviations are assumed to follow either a random walk process conditional to the decision of
not updating or to be a simple white noise shock if the producer decides to update. Hence,





Xt + Át+1 if ut = 0
Át+1 if ut = 1
The producer makes the production decision after observing the current Xt. If the price is
updated,  t+1 is known up to the t + 1 realization of the random innovation Át+1. Finally,
future profits are discounted by the subjective discount factor — < 1.
4There is no theoretical reason why the time cost of production and price setting need to be the same;
but observed behavior in the experiment is consistent with this simplifying assumption.
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There are two important di erences between this theoretical framework and our imple-
mentation of the experimental design below. First, the two tasks will last prolonged periods
and not simply one. This implies a longer lag between the time when a task is started and
the time when it is completed, with an increase of uncertainty that a ects the updating and
production decisions of the producers. In the model, this feature is only in part captured by
the fact that Xt+1 after the price adjustment still has a stochastic component represented
by Át+1. Second, it is possible that the time necessary for subjects to complete the two tasks
may not be exactly the same and could vary over time. While the structure of the model
is time invariant, the calibration of — allows for some flexibility in the transformation rate
between the two tasks since — can be used to modify the relative value of updating even if
the two tasks require the same input of one unit of time. Nevertheless, the model provides a
very good guidance in calibrating the parameters of the experimental treatments and a set
of very useful comparative statics to benchmark our experimental results.
The model is solved numerically by value function iteration for a discretization of the
state space. The associated solution of the policy function ut = m (Xt) provides the inaction
regions of the producers’ updating decisions (the set of values of Xt for which it is more
profitable to produce rather than updating the current price). In addition to the profit
decay parameter µ, the solution of the model depends on the uncertainty about the future
economic circumstance that is embedded in the variability of Á. We model Át as a discrete





h with p = .5
≠h with p = .5
The step size h of the increases (decreases) of Át represents also the standard deviation
of the innovation, and it can be thought of as a measure of the volatility of the underlying
economic fundamentals on which Xt depends. We set — = .98, and we study four calibrations
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of µ and h that are going to match the four treatments in our experiment.5 We choose
fast/slow decay and small/large step size. Intuitively, the inaction region gets larger when
the decay is faster because a faster decay of profits causes a reduction of the future value of
updating; higher uncertainty a ects the inaction region in a similar way. Figure 1 illustrates
the inaction regions for the four combinations of the parameters; the proposed values are
su cient to obtain a substantial variation across di erent combinations.




























































Figure 1: Inaction regions for the stylized theoretical model.
From the numerical solutions, we were also able to obtain qualitative (i.e., directional)
predictions concerning the relative magnitudes of total profits earned. Figure 2 shows that we
should anticipate subjects earning the most profit in the slow decay/small steps treatment,
approximately the same profits in the intermediate treatments, and the least amount of profit
5We adopt a value of the discount factor that is fairly standard for macroeconomic applications. However,
a direct mapping of — into the discount factor of the experimental subjects is not straightforward. Therefore,
we check the robustness of the theoretical predictions of the model for a large set of alternative calibrations
of —, included between 0.80 and 0.99. Smaller values of — shifts the thresholds in Figure 1 to the left by only
a few percentage points, while the comparative statics of the results are completely preserved. Since we are
mostly interested in comparisons across treatments, di erent values of — would be equivalent.
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in the fast decay/large steps treatment, the most volatile of the four. We were also able to
obtain directional predictions on the relative fraction of tasks completed that would be price
updates. Figure 3 shows what we would predict intuitively: That subjects would update
relatively fewer times in the first treatment, approximately the same number of times in the
intermediate treatments, and update prices most frequently in the last.

















Figure 2: Theoretical relative total profits for the stylized model. Values standardized to
profits in Treatment 1.
4 Treatment Design and Experimental Implementation
4.1 Experimental Framework
In order to examine the impact of implicit menu costs on price updating decisions, an
experiment was devised to be administered in a laboratory setting. The experiment was
developed using a combination of HTML5 and Javascript, and it was deployed using the
Google Chrome internet browser.
The experiment put each subject in charge of a virtual pizzeria which sells its pizzas at
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Figure 3: Theoretical share of price updates for the stylized model.
a Current Set Price.6 The subject earns profits (denoted in Experimental Lab Dollars, or
ELD) by fulfilling incoming orders by assembling pizzas with the correct ingredients.7 The
upper left-hand corner of Figure 4 shows the pane into which an order comes. The five boxes
at the top of the ingredient columns indicate the five ingredients for that “order.” These
boxes are populated by randomly and independently selecting an ingredient from a list of ten
possible (note that this means that any single ingredient could possibly occur multiple times
on a single “order”). Below each of these boxes is a column of the ten possible ingredients.
The ingredients in each of the columns are randomly arranged for each new order.
To fulfill an order the subject must use a computer mouse to select the box next to the
ingredient in the column that matches each of the five boxes above it. Once a subject has
selected ingredients, the subject then clicks the “Submit Order” button and earns some profit
6If it is common in experiments to avoid using particular contexts that bias behavior, in our case, framing
the task in the context of a business aids in helping the subjets comprehend the task at hand without either
directing subjects as to how they should behave or providing them with an informative reference.
71 ELD = 0.25 USD. The subjects were informed of the exchange rate before the experiment began.
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if all of the ingredients are correct.8 The subject earns profits determined by the di erence
between his Current Set Price and the Optimal Price, Xt. The problem faced by the subject
is that the Optimal Price changes according to a random walk every 0.2 seconds, where with
probability 0.5 the Optimal Price increases or decreases by step size h. Made available to
the subject is a pane, shown in the lower left-hand Figure 4, where the subject may observe
the realtime movement of the Optimal Price (the green line) and its relationship to his
Current Set Price (the red line) enabling the subject to better understand the variability in
a given treatment. This allows a visual representation of the Xt upon which each subject’s
instantaneous profits depend. The instantaneous profit is also displayed on the screen, as is
the “Cumulative Profit” the subject has earned that period.
The profit earned by the subject when the Current Set Price and the Optimal Price are
equal (i.e., Xt = 0) is 1.00 ELD. Profit per pizza is calculated as   = exp[≠µ · |Xt|]. If
the subject determines that the per pizza profit that he is currently receiving is too low,
then at any point that subject has the option to update his price—that is, set his Current
Set Price equal to the Optimal Price at that moment in time. However, in order to do
this, the subject must complete the task of entering an Update Code that is similar to the
process of baking a pizza. The upper right-hand corner of Figure 4 shows the pane in which
the Update Code is observed and entered by the subject. The top five boxes are populated
randomly and independently with an integer in the set [0, 9]. The numbers in each of the
columns below each of the five boxes are arranged randomly each time the “Update Price”
button is clicked. Upon selecting the box next to each of the boxes next to the numbers that
correctly correspond to the numbers in the five boxes, the Current Set Price is immediately
set equal to the Optimal Price at that moment. To prevent a subject from selecting all of
the ingredients in a pizza then updating his price and then submitting the already-prepared
pizza, any time either the “Submit Order” or “Update Price” button was clicked, all of the
8For ease of exposition, we refer to this action as “baking a pizza” throughout the paper.
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Figure 4: A screenshot showing the user interface with which the subjects interacted.
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checkboxes in each of the columns for both tasks were cleared. That is to say, completing
one task–either correctly or incorrectly–completely reset both tasks.
It should be noted that the decision node for the subject is made immediately after the
completion of the previous task (except for the very first task, of course). Because of this,
there is uncertainty in the profit that will be subsequently earned by baking a pizza. That is
to say, the time necessary for the subjects to complete a task introduces a delay between the
moment a task is started and when the task is concluded. After the beginning of the task,
the Current Set Price can drift several steps away from the initial observed price, following a
richer distribution over time than the simple Bernoulli that governs the price change at each
discrete step of time. This is illustrated for a few steps in the probability tree in Figure 5
and the full distribution is represented for ten seconds from the beginning of a task by the
two panels of Figure 6. The bottom panel illustrates the three dimensional distribution
as a function of time, expressed in seconds, and the deviations of the Optimal Price from
the initial price, measured by the number of discrete steps away from the price observed
at the beginning of the task. The top panel of the figure shows a two dimensional aerial
projection of the same distribution to aid in interpreting the three dimensional distribution.
The distribution is symmetric around the initial price and, as time passes, it spreads out
becoming more similar to a Gaussian distribution. However, it is important to notice that the
distribution fundamentally corresponds to a random walk, and it remains centered around
the initial price at any point in time, making the conditional expected value for the subjects
independent of the time required to complete the task.9
Using the simulation data that we discuss in detail in Section 5.1, we can compute the
average time that passes after someone updates their price until they face a decision at a
particular instantaneous profit given they are following the optimal threshold. Figure 7 plots
9The actual size of these steps depends then on the calibration of h in each treatment, but this does not
have any bearing on the shape of the distribution in Figure 6.
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Figure 5: Probability tree of the Optimal Price deviations from the initial Current Set Price
for four price changes.
this relationship by treatment. One should keep in mind that time passes while engaging
in baking so that the relevant instantaneous profit is the one they observed after, and not
during, baking. Hence, one can encounter prices well below the instantaneous profit threshold
if the previously encountered level was just above the threshold and the price continues to
move further and further away from the optimal level while one is baking. The size of the
markers in Figure 7 corresponds to the relative frequency of observing that instantaneous
profit – higher profit levels are more commonly encountered. It is also worth noticing that
these averages take into account that the probability distribution of the price movements
experiences a truncation every time a subject crosses the optimal threshold. That is to say,
starting at the optimal price, the instantaneous profit distribution has a precise theoretical
form (derived from Figure 5) for any time horizon. However, the portion of this distribution
actually spanned during a price spell will not always be the same because it depends on the
19










































Figure 6: Distribution of price deviations from the initial price observed when an updating
task is started.
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duration of the spell itself.
As would be expected, a higher profit fallo  rate and a larger price step size correspond to
a faster profit decay and also a more rapid realization of the updating thresholds. The three
horizontal red lines are the optimal thresholds in the four treatments. Treatment I has the
highest threshold, but also a relatively smaller profit fallo  than the other three treatments,
which implies the largest average time to hit the threshold (about 80 seconds). We calibrate
Treatments II and III to have nearly the same threshold and instantaneous profit time profile,
while Treatment IV exhibits the lowest threshold and fastest time to reach it. Figure ?? in
the online Appendix illustrates the full time distribution of profits in each treatment after a
price update underlying the output in Figure 7. Consistent with this output, profit di usion
gets faster and falls deeper moving from the first to the last treatment.
4.2 Experimental Treatments
The experiment was conducted in the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the
University of Arkansas. We employed a 2 ◊ 2 within-subject design, and treatments were
ordered so as to mitigate order e ects. Table 1 shows the four treatments and their associated
parameter values, also relating them to the qualitative language used when discussing the
stylized model of slow/fast decay and small/large step size. Further, in order to eliminate
the possibility of backward induction by subjects, they were told that each treatment period
had random termination with an average expected duration of approximately five minutes.
In a given session, every subject faced each of the four treatments, but the order of the
treatments was determined by random assignment.10
Recall from Figure 1, that our theoretical predictions indicate that Treatment I—being
the least volatile—should have the smallest inaction region. The most volatile treatment,
10Four termination times were determined in advance. For every subject, the first period lasted 350
seconds. The second, third, and fourth periods experienced lasted 380, 260, and 300 seconds respectively.
This ensured that fatigue and experience with the interface were held constant.
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Figure 7: Average time at which a given level of instantaneous profit is expected to be
observed by treatment. Simulation-based profit distributions, with ten seconds task duration.
The size of the dots in each sequence of points indicates the relative frequency of realization
of a profit level within each treatment. The horizontal lines indicate the optimal updating
thresholds from simulation.
Treatment IV, should have the largest, and Treatments II and III should be very similar
and fall in between the other two. This is directly related to Figure 3, where we see that
Treatment I should have the fewest number of price updates, Treatment 4 should have the
most, and Treatments II and III being very close to one another and falling in between the
other two treatments. Finally, we see in Figure 2 that we would expect subjects to earn the
highest profits in Treatment I, the least profits in Treatment IV, and intermediate profits in
Treatments II and III.
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Table 1: Profit fallo  parameters and Optimal Price step size values for each of the four
treatments.
Treatment Parameters
Profit Fallo  Parameter (µ) Step Size (h)
h = 0.16 (small step) h = 0.32 (large step)
µ = 0.25 (slow decay) Treatment I Treatment II
µ = 0.50 (fast decay) Treatment III Treatment IV
4.3 Experimental Implementation
Before beginning the experiment, the subjects worked through a series of instructions
explaining the mechanics of the tasks they were being asked to perform.11 They were given
the opportunity to read through these at their own pace and were also given the opportunity
to ask questions for clarification. After reading through the instructions, the subjects were
required to participate a practice round that lasted two minutes12.
Upon completion of the practice round, the subjects were prompted to inform the ex-
perimenter. At this point, the subjects were required to complete a quiz13 to test their un-
derstanding of the experiment. Each quiz was evaluated by an experimenter, and for those
questions that were answered incorrectly, the experimenter privately explained the correct
11These instructions have been included in Appendix A.
12The profit fallo  parameter and step size used in the practice round were di erent from those parameters
used in the actual experimental treatments (µ = 0.375 and h = 0.32). The reason for this was that each of
the parameters were at exactly the midpoint of the two extrema of the parameters that the subjects would
encounter in the experiment. The concern was that if the parameters were too drastic in either direction,
it would condition the subjects to expect a certain level of volatility. Setting the practice parameter values
directly in the middle of the actual experiment parameters gave them a good idea of a baseline, so to speak,
and so what they experienced was somewhat of a perturbation from this initial exposure.
13A copy of this quiz has been provided in the Appendix B.
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answer to the subject. The experimenter then entered a pass-code enabling the experiment
to commence. Prior to the beginning of each treatment, the subject was given a 60 second
forewarning. During this time, the subject was presented with information about the treat-
ment he was about to face. For instance, for Order A, prior to Period 1 (which corresponds
to the parameters used in Treatment 1) beginning the screen displayed the following:
Your first period will begin in 60 seconds.
In this period the Optimal Price will move relatively slowly, and the profit fall
o  will be relatively small.14
Similar information was provided for 60 seconds before each period. At the 10 second
mark the screen turned a bright red color and informed the subject that the next period
began in 10 seconds.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student body at the University of Arkansas,
and a total of 70 subjects participated in the experiment over the course of 6 sessions in the
month of June 2014. Subjects earned an average total profit, including a $5 show-up fee,
of $18.04 USD. Each session lasted approximately 1 hour, which included working through
the instructions, the practice round, taking the comprehension quiz, and participating in
the actual experiment (i.e., all four treatments, each one lasting approximately 5 minutes).
Payouts in excess of the show-up fee were determined by the subjects total cumulative profits
across all four periods.
5 Results
In this section, we enumerate the main results of our experiment, and we discuss them
in comparison to the quantitative predictions obtained from a benchmark simulation of the
14We adopted the language of “period” rather than treatment when communicating with the subjects.
“Period” simply indicates the position in which the subjects encountered the various treatments. For every
subject, there were four periods experienced chronologically; these periods, depending on the Order, could
have di erent treatment parameters.
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experiment. The results can be summarized in three points. First, although the subjects
seem to recognize the state-dependent nature of their price updating decision, they typi-
cally identify smaller than optimal inaction regions. Second, subjects do not follow purely
state-dependent rules and the updating decisions exhibit some degree of time dependence
as well. Third, we observe a large heterogeneity in the thresholds across individuals. How-
ever, conditional on an individual threshold, subjects tend to update their Current Set Price
too frequently relative to the profit-generating production tasks. For ease of presenting re-
sults, we will throughout this section present results corresponding to each treatment in the
following form: (ResultI, ResultII, ResultIII, ResultIV).
The predictions of the model are quite stark and it should not be surprising that people
do not behave in strict accordance with those predictions. Rather the objective is to un-
derstand how people actually behave. Economic models are designed to be simplifications
that capture core aspects of a decision problem and laboratory experiments provide a means
of evaluating the predictive success of those models. In this, we are primarily concerned
with the type of decision rules that people use to determine when they should update their
prices and the behavioral responses to changes in the decision environment. We find that
these aspects of the model predict the observed behavior reasonably well, although people’s
decisions do exhibit some time dependence. That people behave in a consistent manner
and respond to environmental changes in an intuitive manner, we take as evidence that the
subjects understand their tasks and act in a meaningful way. While it is always true that
the participants might eventually change to some other strategy, perhaps to the optimal one,
we find no evidence of learning within our experiment.15
15As described in detail in section A of the online Appendix, we look for learning e ects in two ways.
The first is by comparing behavior in a treatment based on the order in which the subject experienced
the treatment. Such an order e ect, if it existed, would suggest that learning was being transferred across
environments. Second, we compare a decision maker’s behavior during the first portion of a treatment to
her behavior later in the same treatment to look for environment specific learning.
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5.1 Simulation
After the experiment was conducted and the data analyzed, it was possible to simulate
what the optimal behavior would be taking into account the actual time people need to
complete tasks. A simulation is necessary because the experiment adds a significant amount
of complexity beyond the stylized model presented in Section 3. The simulated outcome
of the experiment provides accurate theoretical predictions fully consistent with the exper-
imental design, which can be directly compared to the outcome of the actual experiment.
Looking at the data we deduce the time it took for a subject to bake a pizza by taking the
di erence between when the “Submit Order” button was clicked and when the last event
happened–either the clicking of “Update Price” or “Submit Order.” The data show that the
mode is stark and approximately 10 seconds, with a mean baking task time of (12.9, 12.8,
12.6, 13.7) seconds. If we also look at the time subjects took in order to update their Cur-
rent Set Price to match the Optimal Price, we find qualitatively similar results. The data
show that yet again the mode is very pronounced around 10 seconds, with mean updating
times of (10, 10.5, 10.5, 10.7) seconds. We found that updating and baking times were not
always statistically similar from treatment to treatment, but we find that the di erences are
economically negligible.
For the simulation, we chose 10 seconds for both the pizza baking and the updating
task.16 To simulate this decision mechanism a MATLAB code was written to produce an
optimal price vector according to the same generating function as discussed in Section 3.
The code initializes assuming that the first task an individual will perform is the baking of
a pizza because every period in the experiment starts with the instantaneous profit at its
maximum. The code then moves forward in “time” along the optimal price vector the amount
16We looked at several variations of this task timing choice (mode, median, mean, and introducing noise).
We decided to use 10 for ease of communication and because we found that the variation of the task time
had little to no bearing on the outcome of the simulations.
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of time it takes for the baking task to be performed. Then it calculates the instantaneous
profits earned by baking the pizza at this “time” and adds it to total profits. Next, if the
instantaneous profit is below a given threshold, then the code moves forward in “time” the
amount of time it takes to perform the price updating task and resets the Current Set Price
equal to the Optimal Price. If the instantaneous profit is above the given threshold, then
a baking task is initialized, meaning the code moves forward in 10 seconds “time” along
the optimal price vector, and the instantaneous profit at that point is added to the total
profits. The code does this until 322 “seconds” have been simulated.17 This entire process
is referred to as one simulation.18 The code collects data on the total profits, the number of
pizzas baked, and the number of price updates in that simulation. The code calculated the
average total profit across 10,000 simulations performed at each decision threshold in the
range [0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99]. The optimal inaction regions are defined by the thresholds that
maximize the average total profits.
Table 2 summarizes the pertinent results of the simulation. Of particular note are the
optimal decision thresholds, in ELD, of (0.52, 0.38, 0.38, 0.20). Further, the average number
of price updates at the optimal threshold are (2.9, 4.3, 4.3, 5.3); the average number of pizzas
baked in each of the four treatments are (29, 27.7, 27.7, 26.7); and the average total profits
were (21.4, 16.8, 16.8, 11.6) in ELD.
5.2 Inferring Thresholds from the Data
While the updating thresholds are clearly defined in the simulations, the inaction regions
adopted by the subjects in the experiment are less easy to identify due to the mistakes the
subjects make in establishing the correct thresholds. Therefore, the subjective thresholds
of these regions must be indirectly inferred from the observable decisions of the subjects,
accounting for the uncertainty they face in making their decisions. Our strategy is to rely
17This is the average duration of the four treatments.
18An illustrative example of this process, and a pseudo-code have been provided in Appendix C.
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on a comparison of the distributions of the profits observed by the subjects when they make
a decision of either updating the price or baking a new pizza. Using only the distribution of
the profits for the updating decisions would not be e cient because the distribution of profits
for baking decisions provides valuable information about where it is more likely a subject
places his implicit threshold. Intuitively, if the subjects understand they should follow a state
dependent rule, they would start with a prior belief of the position of the threshold and search
for the most profitable threshold as they conduct the experiment. Obviously, the process of
uncertainty reduction is not going to be flawless, and we can suppose that the subjectively
optimal threshold would lie inside a rather imprecise area of transition from the inaction
region into the action region. Figure 8 illustrates the profit realizations (green line) and the
baking/updating decisions (red and blue squares, respectively) for four of the subjects in the
experiment (such plots for all 70 subjects may be found in Section ?? in the online Appendix).
Each row represents a subject, columns are the treatments, the numeration above each panel
reflects the order in which that subject observed the treatments, the dashed horizontal lines
show the optimal thresholds found in the simulation stage. Instantaneous profits are on the
vertical axis, and seconds are on the horizontal one. As expected, the baking decisions are
typically clustered in the high-profit region, while the updating decisions occur in a region
of lower profits; however, the two regions are only rarely completely disjointed. Updating
decisions are often made for very high profits as well, and some baking decisions can occur at
profits below the average point of price updating. This figure also illustrates well the point
emphasized in Section 4.1 that there is unresolved uncertainty between the decision node
and its completion. We see in Figure 8 that immediately after the completion of a given
task (i.e., the decision node point), the optimal price begins to deviate from where it was
when the decision was made. Looking at the completion of that action, we can see that the
optimal price is as at a di erent level, showcasing the enduring uncertainty throughout the
28







































































































































Figure 8: Price history (green line), price updating task decisions (blue dots), and baking task
decisions (red dots) for a selected set of subjects. Each row represents a subject, columns are
the treatments from T1 on the left to T4 on the right, the numeration reflects the sequence of
the treatments for the subject, and the dashed horizontal lines show the optimal thresholds.
Instantaneous profits are on the vertical axis and seconds on the horizontal one.
The characteristics of these plots suggest a simple approach to estimating the individual
thresholds. First, we estimate the kernel density distributions of the two task decisions by
using a normal kernel (that is, of the blue and the red squares in Figure 8) and compute the
19For comparison with Figure 8 and the companion plots for the entire set of subjects in Section ?? the
online Appendix, Figure A2 in Appendix D reports the histories of profit realizations and decisions made by
seven virtual subjects under optimal thresholds simulation. Although the thresholds are obviously always
respected by these virtual subjects, this Figure confirms the volatility of profits at the moment of the price
updating decisions that reflect the lag between the beginning of a task and its completion.
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respective cumulative distribution functions.20 The survivor function of the baking decisions
(defined as 1 ≠ CDF ) would typically be greater than that of the price updating decision on
the entire support. This can be interpreted as a sort of stochastic dominance which reflects
the fact the density distribution of baking is shifted to the right of the [0, 1] support of profit
realizations relative to the updating distribution, but it does not exclude the possibility
of overlapping of the two distributions. We illustrate this point in general terms for the
aggregate set of decisions across subjects in Figures 9 and 10. At the level of individual
subjects the same result typically holds, with the exception of the few cases in which a
subject never updates during the experiment or updates only once. For these cases, the
density of the updating decision degenerates, and we attribute the threshold simply to that
single observation.
Finally, the threshold is estimated as the profit level that maximizes the distance between
these two CDFs, which basically corresponds to the point where the two densities switch
relative position and updating becomes more likely than baking (coming from the right hand
side of the support). We report the thresholds computed based on the aggregate observations
for the four treatments in Figure 11. It is important to note that the thresholds are indeed
following the relative ordering found in the simulation, with the lowest threshold for the last
treatment and similar thresholds for the intermediate treatments. Nevertheless, as discussed
below, the subjects seem to perceive their thresholds above the simulated ones, uniformly
across treatments.
Turning to the analysis at individual level, we observe a higher degree of heterogeneity
across subjects. The relative ordering of the thresholds is not often exactly satisfied by
the individual subjects and the distribution of thresholds is quite spread over the profit
support as illustrated in Figure 12. As an illustrative example, Figure A3 and Figure A4 in
Appendix D report the survivor functions and the estimated thresholds for the same set of
20Equivalent results are obtained when other popular kernel functions are adopted.
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individual subjects for which Figure 8 is constructed.
We use the data of the optimal simulations to assess the validity of our approach to infer
the thresholds from the distribution of the updating and baking decisions. The results of
the assessment are reported in Section ?? of the online Appendix. The assessment confirms







































Figure 9: Empirical kernel distribution of the decisions of price updating and baking tasks.
Gaussian kernel function for the aggregate set of decisions across subjects.
5.3 Experimental Results
We now turn to observed subject behavior. First, we examine the thresholds subjects
use. Figure 11 shows histograms for the average decision threshold for all subjects in each
treatment. The mean thresholds are (0.70, 0.57, 0.57, 0.38).21 All of these are highly statis-
21We test for the within-subject design by subtracting the average number of the relevant measured values










































Figure 10: Survivor functions (1-CDF) of the two types of decisions. The dashed vertical
lines correspond to the simulated optimal thresholds; the solid vertical lines are the estimated
thresholds implied by the empirical distributions of the two task decisions. Aggregate set of
decisions across subjects.























Figure 11: Estimated thresholds in the four treatments; aggregate set of decisions across
subjects.
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Figure 12: Dispersion of the individual estimated thresholds by treatment. Vertical dashed
lines correspond to the simulated optimal thresholds.
tically di erent from one another (p < 0.001) except for when comparing Treatments II and
III.
As can be seen in Table 2, we find that in all four treatments, the average decision
thresholds used in the experiment are in all cases substantially higher than those determined
to be optimal by the simulations. Figure 12 shows a histogram of the subjects’ decision
thresholds in each of the treatments. The vertical red line indicates the simulated optimal
threshold. As can be seen, the mass of the distribution is well above the simulated optimal.22
di erences was taken for all individuals, and a paired tw-test was performed to test whether or not the mean
of that di erence vector was di erent from zero.
22We would ideally test for statistical di erence in the variance of these distributions to test the hypothesis
that more volatile underlying economic fundamentals would result in a greater variance in the individual
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Table 2: Summary of pertinent data collected from the experiment and the simulation
Treatment I Treatment II Treatment III Treatment IV
Experiment (means)
Number of Price Updates 3.4 4.0 3.9 4.8
Number of Pizzas Baked 24.7 22.5 22.9 20.7
Decision Threshold [ELD] 0.70 0.57 0.57 0.38
Total Profits [ELD] 17.4 13.3 13.1 8.8
Simulation (means)
Number of Price Updates 2.9 4.3 4.3 5.3
Number of Pizzas Baked 29 27.7 27.7 26.7
Decision Threshold [ELD] 0.52 0.38 0.38 0.20
Total Profits [ELD] 21.4 16.8 16.8 11.6
We find the average number of updates per treatments to be (3.4, 4, 3.9, 4.8). Relative
to each other, these averages follow the predictions of our stylized model: Treatment I (slow
price movement, small profit fallo ) has fewer price updates, while Treatment IV (fast price
movement, large profit fallo ) has more price updates, with Treatments II and III being less
extreme. Statistically, we find that there is significant di erence (p < 0.001) between any
two treatments except for Treatments II and III, which do not di er statistically. We find
the mean number of pizzas baked to be (24.7, 22.5, 22.9, 20.7). Again, we find that these
averages are statistically di erent to a very high degree of significance (p < 0.001) in all
cases except for the comparison of Treatments II and III, which do not di er statistically.
Even though we find that subjects have a higher decision threshold in each of the treat-
ments compared to the simulated optimal, the average number of updates in each treatment
of the the experiment (3.4, 4.0, 3.9, 4.8) is quite similar to the number of price updates
thresholds, but there are some limitations in our case. An F -test was performed, and the results showed
that there were no statistical di erence between any of the given treatments’ variances. This should be
heavily caveated with the fact that the F -test is highly sensitive to the assumption that the data follow a
Gaussian distribution. Moreover, it should also be emphasized that the F -test requires that observations be
independent. Since each subject in our experiment experienced each of the four treatments, this assumption
is not met.
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per treatment in the simulations (2.9, 4.3, 4.3, 5.3). At the same time, as can be seen
in Figure 13, we find that the subjects bake statistically significantly fewer pizzas relative
to what the suggested optimal would be in each of the four treatments (24.7, 22.5, 22.9,
20.7 compared to the 29, 27.7, 27.7, 26.7 as implied as optimal by the simulations). As a
consequence, the total number of tasks performed by the subjects falls several units short
of the total number of tasks completed in the simulations. On average, subjects perform
approximately 4 to 6 fewer tasks in each treatment. Finally, considering the fact that the
subjects can complete a smaller number of tasks relative to the simulated optimal, it is not
surprising that we find that subjects earned statistically significantly less total profits than
the simulations (Figure 13). On average, we find that subjects earned (17.40, 13.30, 13.10,
8.80) in ELD. However, the total profits earned vary as predicted by the stylized model from
one treatment to the next and these averages are statistically di erent to a very high degree
of significance (p < 0.001) in all cases except for when we compare Treatments II and III,
which do not di er statistically. Again, all of these data are summarized in Table 2.
Two main e ects can explain this set of results. First of all, given the total number of
tasks completed, the price updating decisions are relatively more frequent than expected.
This reflects the higher inaction thresholds identified by the subjects, which induce people to
update “too early” in state and more often than optimal. The implicit trade-o  cost of price
updating a ects the subjects’ perception of the actual value of an updating decision, causing
them to overestimate the benefits from updating. In other words, subjects do not realize
the correct cost in terms of profit losses they face when updating and seem to put more
importance on producing at higher rates per pizza, thus hastening the price adjustment.
This result can be interpreted in light of the large experimental literature that show that
increased cognitive loads make people more impatient and lead to poorer economic decisions
(see Deck and Jahedi, 2015, for a more complete survey of this literature).
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Second, the subjects are not as e cient at making decisions as machines, and they will
naturally complete a smaller number of total tasks. However, their e ciency is also a ected
by the uncertainty of the environment as the increasing gap between simulated total tasks
performed and actual tasks shows (this gap goes from 4 for Treatment I to 6.5 for Treat-
ment IV). Magnani et al. (2015) document a large dispersion of subjects’ actions around
optimal thresholds, which increases in the volatility of the environment. In their setup the
adjustment cost is known and the average thresholds are quite close to the optimal ones. We
also find a large heterogeneity in the thresholds across individuals, but allowing for implicit
adjustment cost we illustrate a limited ability of the subjects to correctly identify the thresh-
olds. Furthermore, the mistake they make in assessing the thresholds is quite uniform across
treatments and depends only marginally on the uncertainty of the economic environment.
The new feature we introduce in our experimental design, namely the trade-o  between pro-
duction and price setting tasks, has a direct negative impact on the cognitive capacity of
the subjects. The implicit cost of adjustment forces subjects to infer their cost of resetting
prices in terms of forgone profits while they accomplish the updating task, heightening their
cognitive cost. Similarly, the trade-o  adds a real source of distraction for the subjects that
diverts their attention from screening the state of the economy to executing the production
task. While it is hard to precisely disentangle these two channels, they both operate in
the same direction by increasing the likelihood of optimization errors even in the baseline
treatment.
5.4 The Empirical Inaction Regions
A person who is following a state dependent strategy, should always update the price
when the instantaneous profit is below the threshold value (the action region) and should
never update the price when instantaneous profits exceed the threshold value (the inaction
region), as shown in Figure 1. For each subject in each treatment, we have already empirically
36





































































Simulated at Optimal Threshold
Experiment
Figure 13: Experimentally-determined Vs simulation-determined average number of baked
pizzas per treatment (top), number of price updates (center), and total profits (bottom).
Vertical bars show two standard deviations from the mean and are only suitable for compar-
ison of means within treatment (but not across treatments).
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identified the implied threshold value. Figure 14 examines how much variability each subject
exhibits when making choices in their respective action and inaction regions. Specifically,
the vertical axis indicates the frequency with which someone updated the price when the
instantaneous profit indicates they were in the action region–that is, the vertical coordinate
indicates the percentage of times a person updated their price when they should have updated
it. The horizontal axis indicates the frequency with which someone updated their price when
the instantaneous profit placed them in the inaction region–that is, the horizontal coordinate
indicates the percentage of times a person updated their price when they should not have
updated it. A person who perfectly follows a state dependent strategy would appear at the
top left of Figure 14, while someone who is equally likely to update their price when they
are in the action or inaction region would appear on the 45 degree line.
From Figure 14 it is clear that subjects generally update more frequently when they are in
the action region than when they are in the inaction region as almost every point lies above
the 45 degree line in all four plots. In fact, many subjects never update when they are in the
inaction region as indicated by the concentration of points along the vertical axis. However,
when subjects are in the action region with low instantaneous profits they frequently do not
update even though they should. Overall, Figure 14 suggests that subjects behave as if they
use a state dependent rule but have di culty identifying and implementing a stark threshold.
Also this result can be linked to the e ects of cognitive load and bounded rationality that
the subjects face while inferring the optimal thresholds under the endogenous opportunity
cost of updating prices.
5.5 Time Dependence Analysis
The degree to which our subjects exhibited state-dependent or time-dependent behavior
is of particular importance. We assess the presence of time-dependent elements in subjects’


































































Figure 14: Scatter plot of the updating frequencies inside and outside the action region
identified for each individual.
We construct the hazard function computing the probability that an individual will decide
to perform a price updating task after t periods, conditional on not having changed price
for t periods. In order to construct these hazard rates, we first compute the duration of
price spells since the most recent updating task for all subjects in a treatment, and we sort
them in one-minute intervals. The last interval is not bounded in order to accommodate
the non-predetermined end of the experiment for each subject. The hazard rates are then
defined as the ratio of updating decisions in an interval to the total number of updating
decisions made in that and all the subsequent intervals.
As discussed in Nakamura and Steinsson (2007), the shape of the hazard function depends
on the underlying pricing strategy followed by the price setters. In a menu cost model, the
slope of the hazard function is related to the persistence of the shocks to the marginal cost.
An upward sloping hazard function corresponds to non-stationary marginal cost, whereas less
persistent shocks determine flatter (or even partially downward sloping) hazard rates. On the
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contrary, a flat hazard function reflects a constant probability of updating in every period and
would correspond to Calvo pricing. The analysis starts from the hazard functions obtained
from the simulated data, which we compare to the empirical hazards based on the data of
the experiment. Figure 15 illustrates that the simulation-based hazard functions are indeed
upward sloping, as typically expected for this type of state dependent model. Although
similar in magnitude to the theoretical ones, the empirical hazard rates reported in Figure
16 definitely exhibit more irregular shapes, with essentially flat profiles for Treatment III and
IV and large drops for some of the rates in the other two treatments. Moreover, contrary to
the theoretical hazards, there are no observations for the longest durations in Treatment II
to IV. This result reveals the existence of clear deviations of the subjects’ decisions from the
benchmark state dependent model and echoes the results in favor of time dependence found
by Magnani et al. (2015) as well.
We further refine the empirical hazard measures by considering the updating decisions
relative to the inaction threshold of each individual. This allows us to separately study the
updating decisions made inside and outside the estimated action region of an individual,
controlling for potential di erences in state dependence for those actions that may occur
earlier if done inside the inaction region. Similarly, using individual thresholds helps us
eliminate the “survivor bias” that may arise when mixing flat individual hazards for subject
with heterogeneous thresholds, as documented by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008).23
Figure 17 reports the adjusted hazard functions for the four treatments of the experi-
ment. The conclusions analyzed above are confirmed by the hazard functions of the decisions
made inside the action regions, and time dependence does not seem to be determined by
heterogeneity across subjects in our experiment. Furthermore, the hazard rates of the de-
cisions made outside the action regions are downward sloping and, as expected, they show
23The survivor bias in this case would reflect the fact that individuals with lower subjective thresholds
would take on average longer time to reach their action region compared to those with higher threshold
values, causing a falling aggregate hazard function even when all individual hazards are flat.
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that these actions correspond to shorter durations. Subjects who update inside the inaction
region are likely also more impatient. Finally, time dependence in the hazard functions is
not particularly a ected by high volatility treatments (the two treatments on the right hand
side column of these Figures). Magnani et al. (2015) note that time dependence “increases
substantially” when the volatility of the underlying economy is increased, but this result is
not corroborated by our study.
For the second part of this time dependence analysis, we study the ratio of updating
decisions to the total number of decisions made at each point in time in function of the time
elapsed since the last price update occurred. This function represents how the probability of
making errors in performing a price updating changes over time. As for the hazard analysis,
we sort the observations by one-minute intervals and we separate them between action and
inaction regions based on the individual threshold estimates. If price setters are strictly state
dependent, the function would be equal to one and completely flat inside the action region
and zero outside the action region. Allowing for uncertainty and errors in the identification
of the thresholds, we would expect an essentially flat shape in the two regions (although the
function would not be equal one or zero anymore) if time does not have a systematic bearing
on the subjects’ errors in making decision to update prices.
Figure 18 reports these error probability functions for the four treatments of the exper-
iment, which strongly confirm the presence of time dependent traits in the behavior of the
subjects of the experiment. The functions are clearly downward sloping in every treatment
for the decisions in the action region. On the contrary, in the inaction region, the functions
start with an initial spike in the first minute and then become quite small and flat in the
following intervals, which is more in line with expectations under a state dependent strategy.
These results suggest two interesting observations on the types of errors made by the sub-
jects. First, the initial spikes in the functions outside the action region indicate that some
subjects are underestimating their cost of updating, and this leads them to update prices
41
























Figure 15: Hazard plots for each of the four treatments – simulated data.
























Figure 16: Hazard plots for each of the four treatments – experimental data.
42




























Figure 17: Hazard plots for each of the four treatments dividing actions made inside and
outside the identified action regions – experimental data.
too “early” with respect to the state, when the deviation from the optimal price is not that
large yet. As illustrated by the profits di usion plots in Figure ?? of the online Appendix,
the levels of profits for which this may occur are more likely observed at shorter durations.
Second, the low persistence of the error functions inside the updating region represented by
the steep negative slopes of the functions can be interpreted as evidence of habit formation in
baking. Subjects become less likely to perform updating tasks as the price spells get longer,
which will require subjects to be engaged in the production activity for longer durations. A
prolonged focus on a series of baking tasks diverts the attention of the subjects from up-
dating, and reduces the ability of the subjects to recognize the need of a price change even
after entering the action region. This mechanism would be consistent with the view that the
production task operates as a distracting factor, which increases the cognitive load of the
subjects and the likelihood of mistakes in the updating process.
In conclusion, the evidence of time dependence elements in the updating rules of the
subjects presented in this section are broadly consistent with the results of Magnani et al.
43




































Figure 18: Error plots for each of the four treatments – experimental data.
(2015). However, we find that these elements are mostly related to the cognitive load mech-
anism introduced by our experimental design, rather than to the underlying volatility of the
economic environment. In relation to the empirical data from the field, our hazard functions
have shapes more similar to the flat hazard rates computed by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008)
than the downward sloping hazard functions estimated by Nakamura and Steinsson (2007).
This type of hazard function would primarily point to models in which the probability of
updating is constant over time, such as the Calvo pricing, and therefore completely indepen-
dent of the state of the economy. In this respect, our experiment suggests that, although
this type of hazard function does not reflect a purely state dependent pricing rule, it might
still come from subjects who recognize the validity of a state dependent approach to some
extent, but do not always successfully follow it because they experience attention diversion
or limited information processing capacity.
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6 Conclusion
The issue of price setting has been an area of intense macroeconomic research for decades.
With the abundance of possible explanations for observing macroeconomic price rigidity and
the emergence of the use of laboratory testing to evaluate the validity and applicability of
theoretical models, a logical endeavor is to evaluate the e cacy of these price setting models
in a laboratory setting. This paper uses an experiment to understand if individuals behave
in accordance with a strictly state-dependent pricing framework. We do not expect that
subject behavior will perfectly match such a theoretical model. Rather, our objective is to
identify how well an Ss model captures the decision rules that people actually use and how
their responses vary with changes in the environment.
Our work extends Magnani et al. (2015) by internalizing the costs incurred by subjects
to update their prices and thereby introducing an intrinsic element of additional cognitive
demand on the subjects. In this richer environment, we find that in general subjects behave
as if they recognize the importance of a state dependent pricing strategy, but they identify
noisy inaction regions and they also exhibit a substantial degree of time dependence. As
a result, subjects adopt decision thresholds higher than optimal and they end up updating
relatively too often instead of engaging in production as compared to the simulated optimal
behavior.
Our results are consistent with the conclusions of Magnani et al. (2015) and their expla-
nation for time dependence based on cognitive or attention costs. However, we also highlight
a second source of errors related to bounded rationality, which has a very large impact on
the pricing decision of our subjects. When the updating cost is not imposed exogenously,
people will tend to underestimate the actual cost they face to update and they systemati-
cally identify higher thresholds even in low uncertainty environments. The introduction of
the real trade-o  between production and price updating in our experimental design allows
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us to further explore the link between attention and cognitive load in price setting on one
side and some of the resulting errors on the other. We make a few interesting observations
about this point.
The first is that the literature on the negative e ects of cognitive load on the quality
of economic decisions provides a possible interpretation of the main result. It has been
shown that an increased cognitive load makes people more impatient; in our framework,
early updating can be seen as the e ect of impatience on subjects’ decisions. As a second
point, our experimental design introduces a direct and simple micro-foundation of a source of
distraction of the subjects’ attention through the production activity. It would be relatively
easy to design modifications of this framework and study how pricing errors respond to
changes in the type of cognitive cost in order to assess di erent theories of attention. For
instance, the evidence of deviations from optimal price setting due to subjects’ limited ability
to fully analyze the underlying economic conditions could possibly lend credence to the
strand of models that focus on firms’ information processing bandwidth or even “rational
inattention.” Specifically, such a model would have to entail explicit decisions about attention
allocation across signals of di erent precisions, for example associated to updating tasks of
di erent lengths, to infer the underlying marginal cost of production; one of the testable
predictions of the model would be that the precision of the selected signal should increase
in response to higher returns of an incoming order.
Related to the discussion of possible modifications of our design, the third observation we
make is a caveat on the mechanism implemented by our approach. While our experimental
design endogenizes the opportunity cost of updating prices, the updated price was always
set optimally. In practice, if sellers are not given the optimal prices and have to invest e ort
to estimate the optimal price level, then the cognitive costs associated with updating prices
would be relatively greater than in our design. This increased cost, coupled with the risk of
earning sub-optimal profits as a result of an error in setting prices optimally, would likely
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lead sellers to update prices less frequently than what we observe.
The last observation is that our research also provides some evidence on the behavioral
support of di erent theoretical price models as well as of the empirical evidence obtained
from field data on price changes. By directly testing subjects behavior in a state dependent
environment, the first conclusion is that strictly state dependent models are not su cient
to represent pricing decisions; a relatively significant time dependent component emerges
as well. From the flat hazard functions found for the experimental data, we can conclude
that simpler staggered price models as in the Calvo pricing might still represent a valid
alternative to other models to capture these deviations from full state dependence. Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2008) find that flat hazard rates are typical with field data as well. Finally,
as just discussed above, our entire analysis is impregnated by the relevance of cognitive and
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You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If
you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable
amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Your computer screen will display useful information. Remember that the information
on your computer screen is private. To ensure best results for yourself and accurate data for
the experimenters, please DO NOT COMMUNICATE with the other participants at any
point during the experiment. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, raise
your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.
In the experiment you will make decisions over four periods. At the end of the last period,
you will be paid $5, plus earnings based on your profits earned in each period.
Task Details
You are in control of a company that bakes and sells pizzas at a Current Set Price. Your
job is to fulfill incoming orders by assembling pizzas with the correct ingredients. When
submitting an order, you will earn profits based on your Current Set Price and the Optimal
Price. However, market conditions are constantly changing, so the Optimal Price is also
constantly changing.
The further your Current Set Price is away from the Optimal Price (either too high or
too low), the less money you make when submitting an order correctly. At any moment (and
as often as you like) you can change your Current Set Price to the Optimal Price; but in
order to do this, you must enter a code to update your price. After doing so, the Optimal
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Price will continue to fluctuate just as before, possibly moving away from the Current Set
Price again.
Panel Details: Outstanding Order
In the upper left-hand corner of your screen, you will find a panel that looks like the one
above. This is where orders come into your pizzeria. In order to fulfill an order, you must
select the button next to the ingredient that is in each box at the top of each column. Each
column is populated with ten possible ingredients, and the ordering of each of these columns
is random for every order. After you have correctly selected each ingredient, you will click
the "Submit Order" button. Doing this will earn you profits and will bring in the next order.
The more orders you complete correctly, the more profits you earn.
It is important to note that only one ingredient may be selected at a time. If you submit
an order with more than one ingredient selected in a given column, you will not receive any
profits, and you will have to try again.
Panel Details: Optimal Price
Remember that the market conditions are constantly changing, which means that the
Optimal Price for your pizzas is also changing. The Optimal Price changes randomly 5
times per second. In the lower-left, you will find a panel that shows you the current Optimal
Price, like the one in the image above. The green line indicates the Optimal Price, while the
red line indicates your Current Set Price.
Panel Details: Update Code
Remember the further the Optimal Price deviates from your Current Set Price, the lower
your profits per order. At any point you can update your Current Set Price. In the upper
right-hand panel of your screen, you will see a 5-digit code that must be entered in order to
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update your Current Set Price. Simply select the button next to the appropriate number in
each column to match the number at the top of that column and click the "Update Price"
button, and then your Current Set Price will equal the Optimal Price at that moment,
thereby maximizing your profit per order. But remember: The Optimal Price is always
moving, so it may be the case that shortly after updating your Current Set Price, your profit
per order starts to change.
Again, only one number in each column may be selected in order to enter the code
correctly. Also, the ordering of each column is randomized each time a new code is generated.
Panel Details: Profit Information
The fourth and final panel on your screen will give you information regarding your profits.
On the left, you will find a field called "Instantaneous Profits." The number in this box will
update in realtime, and it indicates the amount of profit you will earn if you were to submit
an order at that exact moment. On the right you will see a box called "Cumulative Profits."
This box will display the total profits you have earned throughout the period.
Period Details
There will be 4 paid periods. Each period’s length is determined randomly, but on average
each one is approximately 5 minutes in length. There will be a 1 minute break between each
period. Ten seconds before the next period begins, your screen will turn red. Each period
will be similar, but can di er in two ways: (1) The movement of the Optimal Price over
time can change; and (2) How instantaneous profit depends on the di erence between the
Optimal Price and the Current Set Price can change.
If you want to go back and get instructions, you may do so now by clicking the red "Back"
button below. If you are comfortable with the layout of the experiment, you may proceed
to a 2-minute practice round by clicking the blue "Start" button below. This practice round
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will have no impact on your total profit and it is intended entirely as a means by which you
may familiarize yourself with the operations of the experimental interface.
Ready To Begin?
If you have any questions regarding the experiment, raise your hand now, and an exper-
imenter will come to you and answer them.
If you are ready to begin, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will bring you
a short comprehension quiz to ensure that you fully understand the experiment. Once you
have successfully completed the quiz, an experimenter will enter the password to allow you
to begin the experiment. Note that once the experiment begins, you cannot take a break.
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B Comprehension Quiz
This will not a ect your payo  in any way. It is designed to make sure that you under-
stand the experiment before it begins. Please answer the following questions and then raise
your hand so that a researcher can come check your answers. If you have a question at any
point, please raise your hand and a researcher will approach you.




2. How much money you earn making a pizza depends on
(a) How long ago you updated your Current Set Price.
(b) The Optimal Price when you last updated your Current Set Price.
(c) The di erence between your Current Set Price and the Optimal Price when you
click Submit Order.
3. Your Current Set Price will adjust
(a) Automatically every 0.2 seconds.
(b) When you correctly enter the Update Price code.
(c) Never
4. Each period will last
(a) Exactly 5 minutes.
(b) A random amount of time that on average will be about 5 minutes.
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5. From period to period
(a) The Optimal Price will change at the same rate.
(b) The reduction in profit per pizza as Optimal Price and your Current Set Price
drift apart is the same.
(c) Both (a) and (b) are correct.
(d) Neither (a) nor (b) is correct.
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C Simulation Pseudo-code
Figure A1: An example of an optimal price vector (blue line) and the currenct set price
(green line).
Using the figure above, we will walk through a simple example of how the logic flows for one
simulation.
1. The code initializes (point a in Figure A1) knowing that at point a the Current Set
Price is equal to the Optimal Price. Because of this, it logically knows that it should
bake a pizza.
2. The code then steps 10 seconds into the future (which corresponds to point b in Fig-
ure A1) because it takes time to bake the pizzas, the instantaneous profits earned by
baking it are computed at this point.
3. The code then looks at the instantaneous profits available to it at point b, and:
(a) If the instantaneous profits are below the optimal decision threshold, then the
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code would set the Current Set Price to the value of the Optimal Price at point
b.
(b) Else, the code decides to bake another pizza.
4. Regardless of the outcome of the previous step, the code then moves 10 seconds along
the optimal price vector to point c in Figure A1, and
(a) If the previous action was a price update, then the code performs Step 3 again.
(b) Else, the previous action was the baking of a pizza, then the code computes the
instantaneous profits for baking the pizza, and earns the value for point c.
5. The code then cycles through decision tree represented in Steps 3 and 4 for each point
along an price vector that simulates 5 minutes.
This entire process is one simulation. The process then ran for 10,000 simulations.
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D Additional Figures
We present here some additional Figures mentioned in the main body of the paper.


























































































































Figure A2: Price history (green line), price updating task decisions (blue dots), and baking
task decisions (red dots) for a set of seven “subjects” from the optimal simulation. Each row
represents a subject, columns are the treatments from T1 on the left to T4 on the right, and
the dashed horizontal lines show the optimal thresholds. Instantaneous profits are on the






















































































































































Figure A3: Survivor functions (1-CDF) of the two types of decisions for the same subjects
in Figure 8 with instantaneous profits on the vertical axis. See caption of that figure for
details.































































Figure A4: Estimated thresholds in the four treatments for the same subjects in Figure 8.
Each panel represents a subject, bars correspond to the four treatments, and the numeration
reflects the sequence of the treatments for the subject. Instantaneous profits are on the
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Chapter 2: Rationally Inattentive Consumer: An Experiment
1 Introduction
Cognitive limits in processing information have important implications in a variety of
economic settings. Theoretical studies on stochastic choices (Mat jka and McKay, 2015),
investment decisions (see, among others, Mondria, 2010) and pricing decisions (Mackowiak
et al., 2009), as well as empirical studies on consumers’ choices,1 financial markets and voting
behavior (examples include DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007; Shue and Luttmer, 2009) highlight
the role people’s limitations to paying attention to changes in the economic environment,
even if these changes are relevant for their decisions. While there are several approaches
to information acquisition (see Hellwig et al., 2012, for a survey), this paper is concerned
with the theory of rational inattention pioneered by Sims (1998) and Sims (2003). The goal
of the paper is to formally test the principles and implication of this theory for individual
consumption decisions by using a laboratory experiment.
Sims postulates a model in which a decision-maker chooses optimally the amount of
information for a given decision problem where the cost is based on Shannon’s mutual infor-
mation between prior and posterior beliefs. Following this approach, Tutino (2013) builds a
consumption-saving decision problem where consumers, aware of their cognitive limitations,
change the amount of information and attention in response to changes in the economic
environment. Tutino (2013) explicitly considers the cost implied by Shannon’s mutual infor-
mation as a cognitive cost, i.e. a cost that captures the limits of people to map quickly and
precisely all the available information about the economic environment into consumption
choices. Moreover, the paper shows that for a given shadow cost of processing information,
consumers react to exogenous economic changes by varying the informativeness of the signals
1
See, for instance, Chetty et al. (2009) for an application to sales taxes and de los Santos et al. (2012)
for an application to e-commerce.
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they require to select consumption choices.
This concept, known as elastic information processing capacity, implies that di erent
economic stimuli correspond to di erent consumption behaviors, according to whether the
decision-maker deems it beneficial to save processing e ort by accepting lower consumption or
she prefers to incur the cost of paying additional attention to increase the informativeness of
signals and make sharper consumption choices. Tutino (2013) shows that taking into account
cognitive limitations accounts for a number of empirical regularities in the consumption
literature and, more importantly, documents novel findings pertaining to rational inattention
theory on randomness of choices and asymmetric responses to economic changes that are
hard to reconcile with standard choice theories.
This paper formally tests the predictions of a static version of the model in Tutino (2013)
in a controlled laboratory experiment. In the basic task, a simple decision problem is faced by
the participants, who make consumption decisions under income uncertainty. In each period,
income is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. Prior to selecting a consumption
level, subjects can reduce the uncertainty about their income by acquiring signals that inform
them of how much income they may have available for the period.
The precision of the signal is directly proportional to the cognitive e ort participants
need to exercise in order to extract information. We capture cognitive e ort by requiring
participants to solve logic puzzles, with more di cult puzzles demanding more e ort to
be solved by the subject. Since rational inattention is at its core a theory of how hard
people think, the logical puzzles allow us to measure the e ort participants choose. We
relate the di culty of the puzzles to the informativeness of the signals, with harder puzzles
corresponding to more precise information about income (Civelli and Deck, 2018). Di culties
of the puzzles range from trivial (uninformative) to hardest (perfectly revealing). Upon
completion of a task, participants update their prior beliefs about income and select their
desired consumption level based on their informed posterior.
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If the selected consumption level does not exceed the income drawn that period, the
subject obtains the selected consumption level, otherwise the subject moves on to the next
period with zero consumption. Participants are paid on the basis of their accumulated con-
sumption over the course of the experiment. Other than the opportunity cost of processing
information versus consumption, there is no time limit on any given period.2 By repeatedly
exposing the subjects to each decision problem we can collect data on consumption choices
as well as information/signal attempted and realized choices. These data are relevant in
assessing whether the predictions of the rational inattention model are verified (see Caplin
and Dean, 2015).
We focus on five main specific predictions from Tutino (2013) and design experimental
treatments conducive to directly verifying whether laboratory evidence corroborates these
predictions. The first two predictions we test concern the value of information and stochastic
choices of consumption decisions. Consistent with the theory, the behavioral evidence reveals
that, while on average a more informed subject receives a higher payo , subjects often
prefer to exercise low e ort and process less information even if that choice implies lower
consumption rewards. Moreover, unlike standard choice theories, we verify the prediction
of randomness in choices by documenting stochastic behavior, with consumption outcomes
generating a non-spurious posterior distribution.3
The third prediction we verify concerns whether subjects respond to monetary incentives
by varying their processing e ort. To test this prediction, we modify our baseline experiment
by varying the payo s o ered at specific intervals. In particular, we inform the subject that
in this treatment the payo  will substantially increase every eleven periods while in other
periods consumption values are a fraction of those in the baseline. We find that participants
2
The overall length of the task was random with an expected duration of 20 minutes. Subjects who
neither acquired information nor consumed successfully experienced a 60 second reduction in the alloted
task time as a penalty.
3
For other examples of this result in experimental data connected to rational inattention, see Dean and
Neligh (2017), Khaw et al. (2016), Cheremukhin et al. (2015).
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take advantage of the higher payo  by processing more information in periods where the
consumption possibility are more sizable and reduce their cognitive e ort with respect to
the baseline treatment when consumption o ers are small. Thus, unlike random utility
model where attention is fixed, we document that subjects respond to incentives by varying
information processing e orts when presented with lucrative alternatives. This finding is
consistent with the notion of elastic capacity where individuals modulates their attention
and cognitive e ort according to what is at stake.
The fourth prediction of the theory posits that individuals tend to process less informa-
tion and make less precise consumption decisions when the economic environment becomes
more predictable. We test this prediction by implementing a treatment where the income
process has persistence. In such an environment, we show that subjects change their con-
sumption choice and signal precision infrequently. Generally, subjects fail to realize changes
in their income possibilities as they process less information about income than they do in
the baseline. In particular, we document that participants resolve the trade-o  between cost
of processing more precise signals with the benefit of higher payo s by forgoing units of
consumption rather than acquiring better information.
The fifth theoretical prediction we put to the empirical test is the asymmetric response
of consumers to shocks, with negative shocks triggering faster and more sizable consumption
reaction than positive shock. This prediction is a novel finding in Tutino (2013) which makes
rational inattention theory observationally distinct from other theories of costly information
acquisitions and attentiveness. We verify this prediction by feeding shocks of di erent size
and sign to the predictable environment described for the third prediction. We found cor-
roborating evidence to the finding of asymmetric consumption responses in the direction
predicted by the theory. This finding is also supported by a host of empirical results on
consumption demand (see, for instance, Abaluck and Adams, 2017; Shea, 2009), and the
impact of taxation (Broda and Parker, 2014; Johnson et al., 2006).
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This paper contributes to the literature concerning stochastic choices under uncertainty
and to the recent and growing literature aimed at measuring the role of information acqui-
sition in rationalizing economic outcomes. Recent studies test di erent models of attention
and information acquisition (Khaw et al., 2016; Gabaix et al., 2006; Manzini and Mari-
otti, 2015). Within this literature, a subset of papers (see PInkofskiy, 2009; Cheremukhin
et al., 2015), experimentally test models of rational inattention using binary choices be-
tween gambles. Unlike these papers, our model is designed to directly quantify participants’
choices of cognitive e ort by employing logic puzzles and to relate the e ort to consump-
tion choices. A closely related paper that experimentally checks the predictions of rational
inattention against experimental data with perceptual tests is Dean and Neligh (2017). We
di er from their approach in that we design the experimental setting to test a particular
set of predictions of the rational inattention theory with respect to consumption behavior.
This paper corroborates the empirical tests of Dean and Neligh (2017) regarding incentives
and randomness in rational inattention models. Moreover, we complement their results with
the empirical findings of delayed and asymmetric responses of consumption and attention
to stimuli. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly test for asymmetry in
response to shocks of rationally inattentive agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally presents the theoretical
consumption decision problem under rational inattention. It discusses the properties of the
problem’s solution and the testable predictions. Section 3 lays out the experimental setting
and the treatments implemented to verify the theoretical prediction. A mapping between
experimental set-up and the theoretical model is formally established. Section 4 shows the
congruence of the experimental with the theoretical predictions. Finally, Section 5 o ers
some concluding remarks. Robustness checks are relegated to an Appendix.
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2 Theoretical Framework
We briefly introduce the theoretical framework to provide a structure for understanding
the consumption and attention allocation decisions faced by subjects in the experiment. Our
experimental design implements a static version of the theoretical model by Tutino (2013).
The model derives testable predictions of rationally inattentive agents’ behavioral responses
to changes in the economic environment during their lifetime. We use this model as a guide
to discipline our experiment and to contrast the theoretical predictions with the laboratory
evidence.
The model describes an optimization problem in which an information processing capacity
constraint is added to an otherwise standard consumption-saving problem. We focus here on
the key aspects and implications of these limits to information processing for the consumer’s
optimal decision. We formally outline the model with more technical details in Appendix A.
An agent with limited information capacity faces a consumption decision under uncer-
tainty about her wealth. Since wealth is unknown, the agent cannot know precisely how
much consumption she can a ord. Hence, she must treat both wealth and consumption as
random variables before deciding how much information about wealth she wants to process
in order to consume. As a result, the optimization problem must be expressed and solved
in terms of joint probability distributions over wealth and consumption. By contrast, in the
infinite information capacity case, wealth is perfectly known and utility is directly maximized
by choosing the optimal consumption stream.
More specifically, the optimization problem entails three main parts. First, the agent
starts each period t with a prior distribution on her initial level of wealth; although wealth
is unknown, this prior distribution is not. Let wt indicate wealth, the prior is given by
the distribution function g(wt). Before processing any information, consumption is also a
random variable. This is because the uncertainty about wealth translates into a number of
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possible consumption profiles with various levels of a ordability.
Second, the agent chooses how much information about wealth she wants to process in
order to make informed consumption choices. One way of thinking about the information
processing decision is that the consumer chooses a noisy signal on wealth, where the noise can
take on any distribution selected by the consumer consistent with the information processing
capacity. In other words, the consumer allocates attention to forming a new probability
distribution for w functional to the consumption decision which improves on the prior g(w).
In more precise terms, the reduction of uncertainty about wealth and the consumption
choice, indicated by ct, must be seen as two sides of the same utility maximization problem
which occur simultaneously. Hence, when information cannot flow at infinite rate, the choice
of the consumer is actually the joint distribution p(wt, ct), as opposed to the stream of
consumption {ct}Œt=0 we would have in the full information case. Given that the agent has
a probability distribution over wealth, choosing the joint distribution p(ct, wt) is akin to
choosing a signal on wealth. This is easily illustrated by applying Bayes’ rule to the joint
distribution
p(wt|ct) = p(ct, wt)s
p(ct, wt)dwt
where the type of signal chosen corresponds to the conditional probability p(wt|ct).4
The optimal choice of the joint distribution, pú(ct, wt), depends on the constraint on
the amount of information the consumer can processes. pú(ct, wt) makes the distribution
of consumption conditional on wealth as close to wealth as the limits imposed by Shannon
capacity allow. Before processing any information, uncertainty about wealth is measured
by the entropy of the prior of wealth H(wt) © ≠E[log2(g(wt))]. Since consumption and
wealth are related in the consumer’s decision, knowledge of consumption provides information
about wealth. The reduction in uncertainty about wealth that can be extracted by knowing
4
The conditional distribution p(wt|ct) represents the signal of wealth the consumer receives after con-
sumption is realized, where consumption is a draw from the optimally chosen p(ct, wt).
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consumption is expressed as the conditional entropy (or residual uncertainty) about wealth
once consumption is known, H(wt|ct). The information flow, I(ct, wt), associated with a
signal is the maximum reduction of entropy induced by the signal, which is bounded by the
information that a selected signal conveys, Ÿ,
I(ct, wt) = H(wt) ≠ H(wt|ct) Æ Ÿ.
The bound on the information flow depends on the e ort the consumer chooses to exercise
to track her wealth. Paying attention to reduce uncertainty requires spending some time
and utility to process information. The task of thinking is modeled by augmenting the
optimization problem with a Shannon channel. Limits in the capacity of the consumers
to process information are captured by the fact that the reduction in uncertainty conveyed
by the signal cannot be higher than a given number Ÿt, which explicitly limits the set of
available signals by introducing an upper bound to the feasible information flows.
The third part of the maximization problem regards the transition law from one period
to the next, which in this setup corresponds to how the consumer’s information on wealth
evolves over time rather than the standard law of accumulation of wealth. At the end of
each period, after the realization of ct, the consumer is endowed with a new income draw,
yt+1, from a known distribution which corresponds to the prior of the initial wealth g(w0),
since w0 = y0 by construction. The law of accumulation of wealth reads
wt+1 = R(wt ≠ ct) + yt+1, (1)
where R is the interest on savings. The stochasticity of w derives from the stochasticity of
y.
The way beliefs about wealth transit across states is described by the update law of the
prior g(wt) into its posterior g(wt+1). This law takes into account how the choice in time
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t, p(wt, ct), a ects the distribution of the consumer’s belief after observing ct as well as the
stochastic accumulation of wealth in (1). Given the initial prior state g(wt), the next period
belief state gÕ(wt+1|ct) is determined by revising each state probability as displayed by the




T̃ (wt+1; wt, ct)p(wt|ct)dwt,
where T̃ (·) is the transition function embedding (1). gÕ(wt+1|ct) is used, in turns, as the new
prior for the period t + 1, g(wt+1).
Let u(c) be the utility of the household defined over consumption c. Combining these

















T̃ (wt+1; wt, ct)p(wt|ct)dwt (4)
p(ct, wt) œ D(w, c) (5)
g(w0) given (6)
where µ(·) is the Dirac measure that accounts for discreteness in the optimal choice of
p(c, w), while D(w, c) restricts the choice of the agent to be drawn from the set of distribu-
tions, E0 is the conditional expectation defined with respect to the ‡-algebra I0.
Let ◊ indicate the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (3), the total cost of
an agent of choosing a signal and processing information is then given by ◊Ÿt. We allow Ÿt
to vary over time to capture the possibility that subjects in the experiment may want to
process di erent amount of information within and between treatments. This formulation is
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known theoretically as subject’s elastic capacity of information processing. Subjects’ own ◊
is not directly observable in the experiment. However, we impose a structure of signals with
di erent precision levels representing di erent information flows (Ÿ), and let the subjects
select among the alternatives according to how much time and e ort they want to invest to
sharpen their knowledge of wealth. In turn, this choice determines their optimal total cost.
The program in equations (2)-(6) is a well-posed mathematical problem, but with state
and control variables that are infinite dimensional. However, Tutino (2013) shows that a
discretization of this framework is also a well-posed problem and returns as a solution the
ergodic distribution pú(ct, wt) which, from Bayes’ rule as well, can be represented as
p
ú(ct, wt) = pú(ct|wt)g(wt),
where the marginal wealth distribution is equal to the prior,
s
p
ú(ct, wt)dct = g(wt), to
satisfy model’s internal consistency. The conditional distribution pú(ct|wt) embeds the ef-
fects of more accurate information about wealth provided by the selected signal to sharpen
consumption choices.
Our experiment studies the implications of the equilibrium solution of the static version
of this model. The model is simplified in a static setting since savings are not possible, and
the unused wealth is forgone. In fact, in a static setting wt = yt ’t, and the evolution of
beliefs about wealth (4) is simply replaced by the prior itself g(wt) = g(w0) ’t; similarly, the
objective function turns into the one-period version of (2).
In this case, the optimal solution is readily computed and can be expressed as:
p
ú (c, w) = g (w)
3
e
(◊+ u(c)◊ ln 2) ≠ 1
4
, (7)
which illustrates the solution depends on the shadow cost of processing information, ◊, the
prior distribution of wealth, g(w), and the functional form of utility, u(c).
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In Section 4, we discuss the main predictions obtained from the optimal solution of the
static setting which can be tested with our experimental data.
3 Experimental Design and Implementation
This section discusses our experimental design. We first introduce the building blocks of
the basic experiment and explicitly link them to the theoretical model in Section 2. We then
describe the cognitive tasks the subjects engage with during the experiment and treatment
variations we study.
3.1 Experimental design
We devise an experiment that aims to closely replicate in a laboratory setting the static
version of Tutino (2013)’s model. Throughout the experiment, we present the subjects with
a choice of 256 prizes whose values are expressed in experimental dollars. Prizes are sorted
by increasing cost ranging from 1 to 256. The value of the prizes is directly related to its
cost, i.e. how many experimental dollars it takes for the subject to claim a particular prize.
The subjects attempt to maximize the total sum of prizes accumulated in the experiment
which represents their final payo . Subjects are endowed with a income in each period of
the experiment. Each period, income is drawn from a distribution known to the subjects;
however, the realization of the draw is unknown. Thus, the decision problem of the partici-
pants is to select prizes under income uncertainty. Thus, their decision problem boils down
to selecting prizes under uncertainty about their available budget.
Subjects can reduce uncertainty about how big of a prize they can a ord each period
by choosing a signal of their endowment before selecting a prize. We provide them with an
array of signals with varying levels of precision. The signals provide more information by
narrowing the range from which the endowment was drawn. The precision of the signals
is tightly linked to the cognitive e ort the subjects need to exert in order to reveal the
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signals’ information. The higher the precision of the signal is, the narrower the interval of
possible endowments it provides, and the more significant the cognitive e ort a subject must
exert to achieve the signal. The precision levels available to the subjects and the associated
average di culty levels are illustrated in Table 1. More details about signals, intervals, and
cognitive tasks are discussed in Section 3.2. With the introduction of these signals, the
decision problem of the subjects becomes how much information they want to acquire before
selecting the prizes.
We can explicitly map these features of experimental designs to the building blocks of the
theoretical framework in Section 2. The cost of the prizes is the equivalent of the amount of
consumption c chosen by the optimizing agent in the model. The value of the prizes represents
the experimental counterpart of the utility derived by the agents from consumption. Thus,
choosing prizes is akin to choosing consumption. The endowment in the experiment is
income y, which in the static setup is equal to wealth in any point in time, y = w. The
prior on wealth is the known distribution over the income/consumption support from which
endowments are drawn, g(y). For the sake of concreteness, in the baseline treatment of the
experiment g(y) takes on the form of a discrete uniform distribution on the 1-256 interval.
To simplify the experimental design, the structure of the signals we provide belongs to
the uniform family. In terms of the model, this simplification maps into the constraint (5)
requiring that the distribution is chosen not from any family, but from the discrete distri-
bution. We acknowledge the fact that a uniform distribution is unlikely to be the optimal
for the problem in (2)-(6), since it is the distribution with the highest entropy. However,
we decide to forgo optimality for tractability of the experimental set-up and, more impor-
tantly, to increase clarity for the subjects about the experiment thereby avoiding mistakes
due to misunderstandings of the experimental structure. Under this additional constraint,
subjects can choose any feasible signal precision consistent with their information processing
limits. By allowing the subjects to choose the precision level of the signals, we can infer
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subjects’ information processing shadow cost, ◊. As mentioned earlier, ◊ is not observed;
however, subjects target their optimal total cost of information processing, ◊Ÿt, by choosing
the cognitive e ort associated with a signal.
The interval revealed to the subjects by an acquired signal defines the corresponding
optimal conditional distribution pú(c|w) in the theoretical framework. By narrowing the
support of the income draw, subjects can modify their prior g(y) with a more concentrated
distribution reflecting lower uncertainty about income. For instance, in the baseline treat-
ment, subjects would go from an initial discrete uniform prior on the full support 1-256 to a
discrete uniform distribution over a restricted support, corresponding to a smaller interval.
The observed realization of a particular prize is a draw from the optimal distribution pú(c|w).
Finally, since in the experiment periods are not statistically linked in the baseline given the
i.i.d. nature of income y, the prior g(y) is identical in each period, simplifying the constraint
(4) to gÕ(wt+1) = g(wt) = g(y).
The experiment is deployed in the laboratory using the interface shown in Figure 1. On
the top portion of the screen, the subjects see the amount of time elapsed thus far in the
treatment (in seconds) in the left corner, the period currently being played in the middle, and
the accumulated total prizes on the right. The central part of the screen conveys information
about the possible values of the prizes, while the bottom row of aqua blue buttons displays the
nine levels of precision form the available signals from which the subject can choose. The
buttons describe the size of the possible income intervals corresponding to each precision
level, along with the di culty level of the cognitive task expressed in terms of expected rate
of success. For a signal to reveal the information about income, subjects must successfully
complete the cognitive tasks associated to the signal selected. Both the expected success
rates and the cognitive tasks will be described in details in Section 3.2.
We also use the screenshot in Figure 1 to visualize the mapping between theory and
experiment. Subjects start each period with the grid of all potential prize values that reflects
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Figure 1: Mapping from the theory to the experiment: a screenshot of the experimental
interface over which we superimpose the theoretical framework.
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the di use prior on income g(w). In this example illustrating the baseline, the value of prizes
goes from 1 to 256 experimental dollars and there is a one to one transformation rate from
the cost of prizes to their value. If subjects wants to proceed with no further information,
they would select the first signal (with precision 0 in our classification) and the full set of
prizes would turn yellow, indicating that the space of possible prize outcomes spans the
whole support [1 256].
To make a concrete example, suppose a subject chooses a precision 3 signal and suc-
cessfully completes the associated cognitive task. The signal reveals that income lies in the
interval of 32 prizes from 193 to 224 and the two rows corresponding to this interval are
in yellow. Thus, this particular signal selection allows the subject a reduction of income
uncertainty of 1.5 bits – from the uninformative prior’s entropy of 2.4 bits to the posterior’s
entropy of 0.9, as Table 1 illustrates.
The mapping between theory and experimental interface can be readily seen by inter-
preting the combined structure of prize grid and signal buttons as p(c, w) before any decision
is made by the subject. The optimal policy function of the subject is a strategy that select
a signal whose information is functional to acquiring the prizes. This strategy is defined
as pú(c, w), and in the experimental setting it encompasses both the choice of a particular
signal on w and the information content about consumption possibilities revealed by the
signal (as shown by the dashed red rectangle in Figure 1). Upon choosing the signal and
successfully completing the cognitive task, the optimal posterior pú(c|w) maps into the high-
lighted interval of prizes in the grid, corresponding to the narrower support for the prizes,
or, equivalently, to the reduction of uncertainty about income provided by the signal. The
chosen prize, 194, can be treated as a random draw from the optimal posterior pú(c|w). If
the prize drawn is smaller than the available income in that particular period, the prize box
turns green and the prize value is added to the cumulative prize total.5
5
Subjects are free to choose any prize even after receiving a signal. Knowing the more precise interval,
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Table 1: Signal structure: precision levels, signal characteristics, expected success rate of







0 1 interval of length 256: [1 256] 99% 0
1 2 intervals of length 128: [1 128][129 256] 90% 0.3
2 4 intervals of length 64: [1 64] . . . [193 256] 80% 0.6
3 8 intervals of length 32: [1 32] . . . [225 256] 65% 0.9
4 16 intervals of length 16: [1 16] . . . [241 256] 50% 1.2
5 32 intervals of length 8: [1 8] . . . [249 256] 35% 1.5
6 64 intervals of length 4: [1 4] . . . [253 256] 20% 1.8
7 128 intervals of length 2: [1 2] . . . [255 256] 15% 2.1
8 256 intervals of length 1: [1] . . . [256] 5% 2.4
3.2 Signal characteristics and cognitive tasks
The information processing limits embedded in constraint (3) in the theoretical framework
are implemented in the experiment through the structure of signals of di erent precisions
that the subjects use to reduce uncertainty about income draws. We describe in this section
the characteristics and information content of these signals.
As summarized in Table 1, subjects have access to 9 levels of signal precision. The levels
start from a basic Level 0 signal, which is uninformative and simply replicates the prior of
the income distribution, to a Level 8 signal, which is fully revealing about the income draw.
Letting j indicate the precision level, a signal identifies one of the 2j intervals containing
28≠j prizes into which the full support of prizes is partitioned.
We can compute the information flow of the signals by finding their variation in entropy
starting from the uniform prior g(y). The information flows of the signals are reported in
the last column of Table 1. Since the signal structure is such that signals pertain to uniform
distributions and the supports of the signals are proportional, our signals have the property
though, subjects are expected, but not constrained, to choose from the prizes within the interval, as in the
example discussed here. Section 3.3 describes how the experiment handles the cases in which the chosen
prize is bigger than the income draw.
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that the change in entropy is constant from one precision level to the next, and equal to 0.3
bits.
Subjects must successfully complete a cognitive task in order to acquire a signal. The
precision of the signals is proportional to the cognitive di culty of the task, and the subjects
must exert a higher cognitive e ort to obtain a better signal. We rely on the visual puzzles
developed by Civelli and Deck (2018) to compose these tasks. These puzzles take on the
form of a (3 ◊ 3) graphical matrix in which eight images are provided and one is missing.
Subjects must identify the missing image among a set of alternatives, after analyzing the
patterns of attributes shared by the eight images in the matrix. The puzzles are generated
in the spirit of the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, and their level of di culty is correlated
with the reasoning abilities of an individual. An example puzzle is illustrated in Figure 2,
while the corresponding solution set with eight images is shown in Figure 3.
Each image in the puzzle has six attributes that could change: shape, size, shade of the
filling, orientation, border style, and corner marker style. These attributes are allowed to
change following six schemes of patterns: orthogonal - along rows and columns; diagonal -
along main or counter-diagonal; and corners - from NW to SE and from SW to NE. The
di culty level of a matrix is determined by the number of attributes allowed to change.
Given the puzzle calibration exercises conducted by Civelli and Deck (2018), we are able to
create tasks of any desired cognitive di culty by requiring someone to solve a series of puzzles
of various di culty levels. A task is usually composed of 2 puzzles, with the exception of the
highest precision level that requires solving 3 very di cult puzzles. The reference expected
di culty level of the task of each signal is reported in Table 1 as well.
In the example of Figure 2, two attributes change: shape and size, while shade, ori-
entation, border style, and corner marker style remain unchanged. Notice that along the
diagonal from upper left to lower right, the size is the same. Further, notice that the shapes
vary along the counter-diagonal. Given these observations about the patterns of attributes
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Figure 2: An example of a logic puzzle faced by the subjects.
Figure 3: An example of a solution set for the the logic puzzle in Figure2.
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in the puzzle matrix, one can deduce that option “A” in Figure 3 is the correct solution of
the puzzle since it has the correct characteristics to complete the matrix.
3.3 Experimental Implementation
The experiment was written in Visual Basic, and it was deployed as a stand alone exe-
cutable on the machines in the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the University
of Arkansas. The experiment is a within-subject design, and it is broken into an un-paid
practice round and 3 treatment rounds including the baseline. The practice round lasted 10
minutes and was otherwise identical to the baseline. Treatments are randomly ordered so as
to mitigate order e ects. Before beginning the practice round, the subjects worked through
a series of instructions on their screen, and each subject was o ered an opportunity to ask
clarifying questions before beginning the actual experiment. These instructions have been
included in Appendix B.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student body at the University of Arkansas,
and a total of 64 subjects participated in the experiment over the course of 6 sessions in the
month of May 2017. Subjects earned an average total profit, including a $5 participation
payment, of $25.30 USD. Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes, which included
working through the instructions, the practice round, and participating in the actual experi-
ment. Payouts in excess of the show-up fee were determined by the subjects total cumulative
prizes across all three treatments divided by 500.
In each treatment, subjects face an indefinite number of periods during which they can
try to earn as much money as possible. For each treatment, subjects are told that the
alloted time is random, with an average of about 20 minutes. The unspecified ending time is
designed to mitigate end of game e ects on behavior. At the beginning of a period, subjects
receive a new an endowment draw. In each period, subjects are allowed to attempt to gain as
much additional information about the endowment from the signals as desired. If a subject
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fails to successfully solve the task to obtain a more precise signal, she is free to attempt that
same precision or another level of precision as many time as she wishes. However, once a
precision level is successfully obtained, the subject is unable to reduce the precision of the
signal.6
Subjects accumulate earnings by successfully claiming prizes. Successfully claiming a
prize requires the subject to claim a prize which costs less than or equal to the endowment
drawn in that period. There are three possible outcomes when a subject attempts to claim
a prize:
1. The subject claims a prize of value less than or equal to the drawn endowment. In this
case the subject earns the value of the prize claimed and moves on to the next period.
2. The subject successfully obtains additional information about her endowment, but
chooses a prize with a value that is greater than the endowment draw. In this case,
the subject earns zero profit for the period and moves on to the next period.
3. The subject does not obtain additional information beyond what is known at the
start of the period, simply that the endowment falls in the range of 1-256, and the
subject picks a prize of greater value than the endowment draw. This results in zero
earnings and a 60-second reduction in the length of the treatment that is enforced by
adding 60 seconds to the elapsed timer.7 The theoretical model assumes an utility
cost that the consumer incurs for zero consumption when it attempts c > w. This
cost is embedded in the assumed functional form of the utility, CRRA family and log
in its limit, which delivers negative infinite utility in case c = 0. This assumption is
6
This assumption encoded in the experimental setting captures the well-known principle in information
theory that information cannot be forgotten. In order to avoid subjects having to rely on cognitive e ort
to remember the more informative signals, we prevent them from choosing signals with lower precision than
the ones successfully obtained.
7
Incurring the penalty does not mean the subject has to sit idle for 60 seconds. It means the length of
time over which the subject can try to earn money is reduced by 60 seconds.
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made to prevent the decision maker from adopting a random consumption strategy
without acquiring any information about income. In the experimental setting the 60-
second penalty ensures that random consumption strategy is strictly dominated by an
informed consumption strategy, preventing the subjects from utilizing a mechanical
strategy in which they meaninglessly guess prizes a large number of times hoping to
rapidly accumulate prizes.8
Choosing a prize concludes one period; as mentioned above, subjects encounter as many
periods as they can within the timeframe of the treatment. At the beginning of each period,
the subjects return to the state of only knowing that their income has been drawn from
g(y), and they are again able to choose whether or not to pursue more precise information
regarding the value of endowment.
3.4 Experimental Treatments
Up to this point the description of the task has focused on the baseline (Treatment 1). In
Treatment 2, the endowment is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on the support
[1 256] as in Treatment 1; however, in Treatment 2 the value of prizes are increased by an
order of magnitude every (10th) period and decreased by an order of magnitude in all other
periods. That is, in periods 11, 22, 33, etc., the value of every prize shown on the screen is
multiplied by 10 in comparison to the prizes shown in Treatment 1. For the other periods the
displayed prizes are one tenth the amount displayed in Treatment 1. The ratio of high payo 
to low payo  periods is such that the expected payo  is the same across all treatments. In
Treatment 3, the mapping of prize value to profit was the same as in Treatment 1, but the
endowment is determined di erently. For the first period, the endowment is drawn from the
usual uniform distribution. For each subsequent period, there is an 80% probability that
8
In the experiment the penalty is levied to the participants who attempt c > w either without trying any
signal or unsuccessfully trying a signal. The two cases are observationally equivalent in terms of information
e ectively acquired to reduce uncertainty with respect to the initial prior.
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the endowment is the same as it was in the previous period and a 20% chance that the
endowment is determined by a new draw from the uniform distribution.
4 Results
In this section we introduce five testable predictions we obtain from the comparative
statics based on the solution of the static model in (7). We use the data from the laboratory
to test these predictions in each of the sections below.
4.1 Information and consumption
The first testable prediction stemming from the model is that the more information
agents acquire, the higher their consumption is. We test this prediction by examining the
relationship between precision of information chosen by the participants and their realized
consumption outcomes. In our experiment, precision of information relates to the cognitive
tasks participants have to solve to know where their income lies. The harder the task is, the
smaller the width of the interval revealing where the actual income is. We test whether a
participant solving more di cult cognitive tasks enjoy higher profits than a participant who
selects easier tasks.
Figure 4 illustrates the relation between successful consumption choices and the signal
precision acquired, for all subjects in Treatment 1 of the experiment. The positive relation
is clearly shown by the estimated OLS fitted line; the estimate slope coe cient is 16.9 and
it is significant at 1%. Individuals with better information are also able to obtain higher
successful realizations of consumption.
The figure also summarizes a couple of interesting properties of the consumption and
precision decisions across individuals. First, we can clearly observe how the consumption
choices are clustered at the intervals determined by each signal level. The points favor the
lower portion of the intervals, as we would expect even for risk neutral subjects, but they
82
Figure 4: Scatter plot between consumption choices and the signal precision acquired. All
subjects and all treatments.
Figure 5: Treatment 1: Scatter plot between average successful consumption and average
signal precision acquired by each subject. The color-bar indicates the average time in seconds
spent for information acquisition by the subject before a consumption choice is made.
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are actually spread out and not concentrated on the lower extreme of the interval. We
will go back to this point in Section 4.2 too. Second, the majority of the signals chosen
by the subjects are for the first levels of precision up to level 4. Precision 5, 6, and 7 get
progressively more infrequent as the cognitive cost of acquiring the signal gets higher. Level
7 is virtually never chosen and Level 8 is never successfully completed indicating it correctly
approximates an infinite information capacity situation.
Similarly, Figure 5 shows the scatter plot between average precision acquired by each
subject and average successful consumption in the baseline, Treatment 1. The color of the
dots indicates the average time in seconds spent by the subject to acquire information before
making the consumption choice, based on the scale on the right hand side of the figure.
The plot confirms a strong positive relation between consumption and precision too, with an
estimated coe cient of 14.1 (significant at 1%). As expected, we can also observe a general
increase in the period length as the precision of the signal goes up.
4.2 Restricted consumption support
The second testable prediction of the model is that the optimal probability distribution
p
ú (c, w) assigns positive probability to only an handful of values out of the full the support of
c. A rationally inattentive consumer focuses only on a restricted subset of c, placing higher
probability of selecting within that restricted support than everywhere else.
This prediction from the rational inattention model is observationally distinct from other
theories of values where either the mean of the support is chosen with probability one or
all the values in the support of c are equally likely to be chosen. Moreover, unlike habit
formation, where an ad-hoc shape of utility is needed to elicit the behavior predicted by
the theory, rational inattention derives this prediction from people’s optimizing behavior of
balancing cost and benefit of information gathering.
In the experimental setup, we test for this prediction by looking at the empirical dis-
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(a) Precision 1 (b) Precision 2
(c) Precision 3 (d) Precision 4
(e) Precision 5 (f) Precision 6
Figure 6: Aggregate distributions of consumption choices for all subjects by signal precision.
The intervals corresponding to a signal that spans di erent portions of the consumption
space are superimposed to form a common distribution support.
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tribution of consumption selections conditional on the signal received by the subjects. If
the prediction holds, choices of consumption would display a restricted support; within that
support, the consumption distribution would not take on the form of a uniform distribution
since some outcomes will be more likely to be selected than others and some will not be
selected at all, nor would it be a degenerate distribution with all probability concentrated
on one particular value of the support.
We next discuss some evidence that corroborates this prediction. We begin with the
simple histograms of the aggregate distributions of consumption choices made by all subjects
in all treatments, reported in Figure 6. Each panel of the Figure refers to a precision level in
which the di erent intervals corresponding to that precision level – disjoint, but of the same
length – are superimposed. We focus on precision 1 to 6, since we do not have su cient
observations to generate reliable plots for higher precision levels.
The distributions typically exhibit higher densities on the lower portion of the intervals;
however, we also find substantial distribution density on the rest of the segment. This
evidence suggests that the empirical distribution of the subjects’ consumption choices is
left-skewed – reflecting moderate risk aversion. However, the distribution is not spurious
and it is not concentrated at a single point common to all subjects. Similarly, the optimal
distributions of consumption are not uniform either, a di erence from the prior.9
These histograms help us show some properties of the observed distribution of consump-
tion, but they are based on aggregate data for all subjects and hide individual choices. We
consider distributions at the individual level, then, in order to fully assess the restricted
support prediction. In fact, individual subjects might select only an handful of consumption
9
The distribution of Precision 3 exhibits a density peak at position negative one. This position indicates
a consumption choice outside the interval revealed by the signal, corresponding to the upper extreme of the
interval preceding the revealed one. This concentration of the density reflects the behavior of an individual
who acquired precision 3 signals multiple times and systematically chose one unit of consumption less than
the minimum allotted by the revealed signal. There are three other subjects for which this behavior occurs
episodically. We judge those instances as mistakes as opposite to deliberate choice and do not include them
in Figure 6.
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points, but if these points are distinct from one subject to the next then aggregation would
cause overall distribution to look more dispersed. We assess this possibility by reporting in
Figure 7 the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the individual consumption distributions
for each subject for signal precision 1 to 4.
The HHI is typically used to measure market concentration. It is calculated by summing
the square of the market shares of competing firms in an industry, and it has a maximum
value of 10,000 when the market is full concentrated in the hands of one single firm. In our
situation, we first compute the frequencies of the consumption choices made by a subject over
the support defined by the overlapped intervals corresponding to a certain signal precision.
We then calculate the HHI of the consumption choices of an individual summing up the
square of the frequencies of selected consumption levels. Finally, we normalize the HHI’s by
10,000 and order the normalized HHI values in decreasing order to report them in Figure 7.
The HHI is an intuitive and rapid way to provide information about the dispersion of
consumption levels chosen by the subject although it is not always possible to uniquely map
an HHI value into the exact number of points chosen. To this end, the horizontal red lines
in Figure 7 provide some reference levels. For instance, when an HHI bar is equal to 1, the
subject chose the same point every time he received a signal with that precision. The red line
at a height of 0.5 denotes the normalized HHI for a subject who chooses each of two points
with equal frequency. The following lines follow the same principle: 0.25 for four choices
each with a 14 share, .1 for 10 choices each with a
1
10 share. The figure omits subjects that
make only one consumption choice for which the HHI is trivially 1.10 We include subjects
that make two choices to check whether their HHI di ers from the trivial result of 0.5. These
cases, HHI=1 with two choices, are displayed in red bars.
The subjects are ordered on the horizontal axis. Since the number of signals is endogenous
the number of subjects varies by precision level. The histograms show that the majority
10
There are a total of 23 such cases out of 122 subject-precision observations in the sample of Figure 7.
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(a) Precision 1 (b) Precision 2
(c) Precision 3 (d) Precision 4
Figure 7: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the individual consumption distributions
for all subjects for signal precision 1 to 4. The indexes are normalized by 10,000 and sorted
in decreasing order. The horizontal lines indicate the HHI value that would occur if the
subject were to choose the number of points indicated on the right vertical axis with the
same frequency. Subjects who make a single consumption choice are omitted. Red bars
indicate subjects with two consumption choices and HHI=1.
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of subjects, do not focus exclusively on a single consumption level for a given precision.
Further, almost half of the subjects spread their choices among four or more consumption
choices within the revealed interval (HHIs fall below .25).
Overall, the evidence of this section strongly suggests both the transformation of the
prior distribution into a non-uniform and non-degenerate optimal consumption distribution,
and the concentration of consumption decisions on relatively small sets of choices, but not
on a single choice.
4.3 Convex Payo s and Information Processing
The third testable prediction from the model concerns the e ects of incentives on subjects’
information acquisition and information processing. The prediction states higher payo s are
associated with more informed decisions. Intuitively, the prediction states that individuals
pay more attention to the economic environment the higher the stakes are. We verify this
prediction in Treatment 2, in which we vary the concavity of the payo s by varying their
magnitude across periods within the Treatment. As we explained in Section 3, the payo 
variations occur at a pre-determined and known frequency: every eleventh period.
We assess the implications of payo  fluctuations in Figures 8 and 9. In these Figures,
the red bars refer to signals pursued on the “eleventh” periods, when we impose higher
payo s in Treatment 2, while the blue bars correspond to the other periods, when we have
lower payo s in Treatment 2. It is worth keeping in mind that the payo s di er by a factor
of 100 between the high and low stakes periods of Treatment 2. Figure 8 illustrates the
distribution of the maximum signal precision that subjects attempted to acquire before each
consumption decision, regardless of the successful attainment of the signal. All subjects and
all information acquisition instances are pooled together by treatment, and the distribution
in Treatments 2 is compared to the baseline distribution in Treatment 1.
Two observations are noteworthy. First, as expected, there should not be di erences
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between the eleventh and o -eleventh period distributions in Treatment 1, since the subjects
do not observe any change in the payo  structure in this Treatment. A KS test to compare
the two distributions cannot reject the null that empirical distributions are the same (p-value
of .88). In Treatment 2, the two distribution noticeably move apart from each other. The
high payo  distribution shifts to the right, and reaches its peak for precision level 3. This
shows how subjects seek better information in the high payo  periods in Treatment 2. The
regular payo  distribution, on the contrary, shifts to the left, relative to the Treatment 1,
with the highest mass concentration at precision 0. This reflects the optimal strategy of
reducing attention in the low stakes periods, while increasing it in the high stakes moments.
The di erence in the two distributions is confirmed by the KS test too, which rejects the
null at very high confidence level (p-value of .00).
Comparing the distribution across treatments, we find that the mean of the distributions
in Treatment 1 is between precision 1 and 2; in Treatment 2 the mean of the high payo 
distribution is between precision 2 and 3, while for low payo s it is between 0 and 1. We
formally test whether these distribution are the same across Treatments using the KS test
again. The tests reject the null of same empirical distribution for both high and low payo s
states at extremely high level of confidence (p-value of .00).
As a robustness check, Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of the average maximum
precision of the signals attempted by each individual by treatment. As before, the eleventh
and o -eleventh period distributions are very similar in Treatment 1. There is no reason
for subjects to change their behavior in this case since there is no material change in the
economic environment from one period to the next in the baseline treatment. By contrast,
in Treatment 2, the distribution of the high payo  periods shifts to the right, away from the
least informative signal that dominates in the low payo  periods. Thus, this second set of
figures corroborates the result that participants trade-o  e ort when the payo  is small for
higher precision when the payo  is more substantial.
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(a) Treatment 1 (b) Treatment 2
Figure 8: Distributions of the maximum precision of attempted signals – Treatment 1 Vs.
Treatment 2. Period numbers that are a multiple of 11 in red while other periods are in
blue. All subjects, all attempts.
(a) Treatment 1 (b) Treatment 2
Figure 9: Distributions of the average maximum precision of the signals attempted by each
subject – Treatment 1 Vs. Treatment 2. Period numbers that are a multiple of 11 in red
while other periods are in blue. All subjects, averages by subject.
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As a consequence of the decision of allocating more attention to the economic environment
in the high payo  state, consumption should be higher in the “eleventh” periods.11 We
illustrate this point in Figure 10, where we estimate the non-parametric aggregate density
distribution of consumption in the high and low payo  periods in Treatment 1 and 2 by
using a normal kernel estimator.
In panel (a) of the Figure we see the two densities for Treatment 1 closely overlap.
The density for the non-eleventh periods is less smooth, though, since the larger number
of observations allows for a more precise estimation of the density. On the contrary, the
densities in panel (b) for Treatment 2 exhibit two distinguishable density peaks. For the
high payo  distribution the density maximum is achieved around 130 unit of consumption,
while for the low payo  density this peak is shifted far to the left indicating a high density
concentration at poor consumption levels.
A similar result is conveyed by Figure 11 where we plot the aggregate density distribu-
tions of unused income, as a percentage of the income draw – a measure of the “error” in
consumption made by the subjects. Again, the two densities are the same for Treatment 1,
while they have a completely di erent shapes in Treatment 2. In particular, we find a mass
concentration at very low and very high levels of unused income respectively for the high
and low payo  periods.
In summary, the results of this Section imply that participants with limited ability to
process information choose more information about options that provide them with higher
utility and, as a consequence, make better consumption decisions. This result is intuitive
since a higher reward implies an higher benefit to process more precise information o setting
its cost. Consistent with these findings, the optimal probability distribution pú (c, w) is more
informative the higher the payo  is.
11
This is obviously the case if the attempted signal precision reported in Figure 8 lead to successful
information acquisition too. In our data, we find that about 85% of the signal attempts are successful.
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(a) Treatment 1 (b) Treatment 2
Figure 10: Aggregate density distribution of successful consumption choices – Treatment 1
Vs. Treatment 2. Estimation by normal kernel function. High payo  periods in red; low
payo  periods in blue. All subjects.
(a) Treatment 1 (b) Treatment 2
Figure 11: Aggregate density distribution of unused income, as a percentage of the income
draw – Treatment 1 Vs. Treatment 2. Estimation by normal kernel function. High payo 
periods in red; low payo  periods in blue. All subjects.
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4.4 Predictability of economic environment
The fourth prediction posits that a rationally inattentive person responds to a more
predictable environment – higher persistence of g (w) – by processing less information. That
is, the optimal probability distribution of consumption conditional on the signal chosen
by the participant, pú (c|w), is more dispersed in the case in which the environment is less
uncertain, reflecting either a less precise signal acquired in the more predictable environment
or more "mistakes" in consumption when learning about the environment turns out to be
more costly than forgoing consumption units. We rely on Treatment 3 to test this prediction.
This prediction can have two di erent outcomes on the behavior of the subjects in the
experiment. One the one hand, they could periodically increase signal precision, when they
realize an income shock has occurred, to reset information about their income level. After
acquiring more information, they would maintain a low precision signal relying on the high
persistence of the process. On the other hand, if the cost of increasing precision level is
su ciently high, they could opt for a low precision level by default and use consumption
choices to explore the income space. In this case, they would gropingly increase consumption
after a positive income shock, trying to figure out the new higher income. Similarly, they
would progressively reduce consumption after a negative shock, trying to detect the new
lower income.
As we saw in Section 4.3, the cognitive cost of the signals necessary to acquire better
information is relatively high in our experimental setup. In Treatment 2, for instance, the
ten fold increase in the magnitude of payo s was su cient to move up precision of the signal
by roughly only one notch. This tendency is confirmed by Treatment 3 as well, and the
second type of behavior described above prevails. We illustrate this point in the two panels
of Figure 12, where the average income, consumption, and precision time profiles in the
neighborhood of an income shock are reported for all subjects in Treatment 3. The figures
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(a) Positive shocks (b) Negative shocks
Figure 12: Average income, consumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income
shock, centered at time 0. Two periods before the shock and the three periods after the
shock are showed. All subjects in Treatment 3.
are re-centered on the period in which the shock occurs, time 0 on the horizontal axis. The
time series show the two periods before the shock and the three periods after it. We consider
all episodes followed by at least three periods of constant income level. The left panel refers
to the positive shocks, while the right panel to the negative ones.
While income jumps up with a positive shock (green line), the precision level minimally
varies (blue line). However, consumption (red line) follows the direction of the shock and it
is used by the subjects in place of a change in precision. In case of a negative shock, though,
the response is more hybrid. Consumption drops at time 0, following income. Precision is
increased in the next period, for just a period to provide one with a better sense of the new
income level. After that, subjects start slowly moving up their consumption choices to learn
more about income, as done for a positive shock.
We also find, however, the behavior of the subjects can be quite idiosyncratic. Some of
them, probably those who have higher cognitive capacity, prefer to manipulate the precision
level after a shock, as we document in Appendix C.
95
4.5 Asymmetry in delays
The fifth proposition deals with the di erences in subjects’ responses to positive and
negative income shocks. The theory predicts an asymmetric response to shocks of opposite
sign. Although subjects naturally exhibit a delay in the response regardless of the type of
shock, the response to bad income shocks should be faster and sharper than to good income
shocks. Intuitively, this is because bad shocks elicit the allocation of more attention from
the subjects.
This prediction, which is unique to RI with respect to other mainstream theories, can be
tested with our results comparing subjects’ reaction to a period in which income falls with
the reaction to a period in which income increases. Basically, a negative shock to income
should be detected faster since previous consumption choices may no longer be available,
whereas if the participant is sticky in its consumption choices an increase in income may go
undetected for several periods.
Figure 13 replicates Figure 12 for two levels of shock intensity. The first row refers to
shocks larger than two thirds of the income support (i.e. 162 units of income); the second
row refers to shocks smaller than one third of the support (smaller than 94 units of income).
Considering di erent sizes of the shocks helps us highlight di erences in the speed of the
responses.
We find that the responses of consumption and precision to income shock closely follow
the predicted asymmetry. In the first row, a large negative shock causes an immediate
correction of consumption that rapidly drops and remain low. On the contrary, subjects
respond only gradually to a large positive shock. The adjustment process is indeed quite
slow, and a faster correction would require subjects to increase the precision of the acquired
signal. For small shocks, illustrated by the last row of the same Figure, the subjects’ response
is less sharp and milder for the positive shock, while it is still quite rapid and deep for the
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negative shock. Very interestingly, the negative shock induces a clear increase in the precision
level the first period after the shock, which is totally missing for positive shocks. The negative
shocks are perceived as more worrying, so that they also require an adjustment in the signal
precision.
Overall, the size and timing of the reactions to income shocks is strongly supportive of
this prediction of the model.
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(a) Large positive shocks (b) Large negative shocks
(c) Small positive shocks (d) Small negative shocks
Figure 13: Average income, consumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income
shock, centered at time 0. Two periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock
are showed. Large shocks are larger than 162 units of income; medium shocks are between
94 and 162 units of income; small shocks are smaller than 94. All subjects in Treatment 3.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The paper shows that subjects in a controlled laboratory experiment largely behave in
accordance with the predictions of rationally inattentive consumption theory. Specifically,
we find that subjects
• consume stochastically, with their consumption choices reflecting a draw from their
optimal posterior distribution of consumption conditional on signals about income.
• respond to incentives by varying the informativeness of their optimal posterior to-
ward higher consumption values, consistent with the postulates of elastic information
processing capacity.
• react asymmetrically to shocks of income, with stronger and faster adjustment of con-
sumption to negative shocks than positive ones.
The last of these findings is particularly noteworthy because, to the best of our knowledge,
it is the first direct evidence of a pattern that is predicted by rational inattention, but not
by other models.
We map the mutual information between prior and posterior beliefs by rigorously mea-
suring attention and information processing using cognitive tasks and consumption choices.
As research on behavioral modeling strategies focusing on information processing and atten-
tion advances, this paper constitutes a step towards bridging the gap between theoretical
models and applied measurements.
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7 Appendix
A The theoretical Model
The theoretical model borrows from Tutino (2013). An agent faces a consumption de-
cision under uncertainty about her wealth and acquires information about the distribution
of her income under an information processing capacity constraint. To understand the im-
plications of limits to information processing, we start with the standard, full information
version of the problem.
Let ( , B) be the measurable space, where   represents the sample set and B the event set.
States and actions are defined on ( , B). Let ct, ct, and wt respectively indicate consumption,
income, and wealth at time t. Let It be the ‡≠algebra generated by {ct, wt} up to time
t, i.e., It = ‡ (ct, wt; ct≠1, wt≠1; ...; c0, w0). Then, the collection {It}Œt=0 such that It µ Is
’s Ø t is a filtration.













s.t. wt+1 = R (wt ≠ ct) + yt+1 (9)
w0 given (10)
where — œ [0, 1) is the discount factor and R = 1/— is the interest on savings, (wt ≠ ct).









follows a stationary Markov process with constant
mean Et (yt+1| It) = ȳ.
12
We can assume that the utility belongs to the CRRA family, u (c) = c1≠“/ (1 ≠ “) with “ the coe cient
of risk aversion.
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Consider now a consumer who cannot process all the information available in the economy
to track precisely her wealth. This not only adds a constraint to the decision problem, but
fundamentally a ects each constraint (9)-(10) in four important ways.
1. Since the consumer does not know her wealth, (10) no longer holds. Her uncertainty
about wealth is given by the prior g (w0).
2. Before processing any information, consumption is also a random variable. This is
because the uncertainty about wealth translates into a number of possible consumption
profiles with various levels of a ordability. It follows that to maximize lifetime utility,
consumers need to jointly reduce uncertainty about wealth and choose consumption.
The consumer chooses the joint distribution p (c, w).
3. With respect to the program (8)-(10), there is a new constraint on the amount of
information the consumer can processes. The reduction in uncertainty conveyed by
the signal depends on the attention allocated by the consumer to track her wealth. We
append the Shannon channel in equation (11) to the constraint sets. The information
flow available to the consumer is a function of the signal, i.e. the joint distribution
p (·ct , ·wt). In formulae:
Ÿt Ø I (p (·ct , ·wt)) =
⁄
p (ct, wt) log
A
p (ct, wt)
p (ct) g (wt)
B
dctdwt (11)
4. The update of the prior replaces the law of motion of wealth using the budget con-
straint in (9). To describe the way individuals transit across states, define the operator
Ewt (Et (xt+1)| ct) © x̂t+1, which combines the expectation in period t of a variable in
period t + 1 with the knowledge of consumption in period t, ct, and the remaining
uncertainty over wealth. Applying Ewt (Et (·)| ct) to equation (9) leads to:
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ŵt+1 = R (ŵt ≠ ct) + ‚y (12)
where,
‚
y = Ewt (Et (yt+1)| ct)
© Ewt (Et (yt+1| It)| ct) + [Ewt (EEt (yt+1)| ct) ≠ Ewt (Et (yt+1| It)| ct)]
LIE= ȳ + Ewt [(Et (yt+1)| ct) ≠ (Et (yt+1)| ct)]
= ȳ.
Given the initial prior state g (w0), the next belief state gÕct (wt+1) is determined by
Bayesian conditioning as
g
Õ (wt+1| ct) =
⁄
T̃ (wt+1; wt, ct) p (wt|ct) dwt, (13)
which is the transition equation we have in the main text too. In (13), the function
T̃ is the transition function representing (12) and the belief state itself is completely
observable. Bayesian conditioning satisfies the Markov assumption by keeping a su -
cient statistics that summarizes all information needed for optimal control. Thus, (13)
replaces (9) in the limited processing world.
Combining all these points, the problem of the household under rational inattention can
be expressed by the program in equations (2)-(6) in Section 2.
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B Instructions for the Laboratory Experiment
We report below the instruction sets that were provided to the subjects during the ex-
periment:
A. General Instructions
B. Instructions for Treatment 1
C. Instructions for Treatment 2
D. Instructions for Treatment 3
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General Instructions 
Page 1 of 5 
 
You will be paid in cash at the end of today’s study based upon the decisions you make, so it is 
important that you understand the directions completely.  If you have a question at any point, 
please raise your hand, but otherwise you should not talk or communicate with anyone. 
Overview 
This study involves 3 paid phases that each last about 20 
minutes (the exact time for a part is random).  During that 
time you can complete as many periods as possible.  Each 
period you can earn money and you will be paid based on 
the total amount of money you earn from all three paid 
phases.  Your payment in $US will equal your cumulative 
earnings from all three phases divided by 500.  Each of the 
paid phases is slightly different and you will be given specific 
instructions about each phase just before it begins.  Before 
the paid phases you will go through a practice phase to 
familiarize you with the decision process.   
 
 
How You Earn Your Payoff 
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More Details About Each Step  
You will use the interface (shown below) to interact with the computer. The interface tells you 
the current period, the elapsed time in seconds, and your accumulated prizes. Then, it shows a 
grid of possible prizes available in the current and a row of blue buttons to choose the 
information you want to receive about the prizes. 
 
Step 1: Maximum Possible Prize 
Each period there are 256 possible prizes. For instance, in the practice phase the prizes are 1, 2, 
…, 255, 256. The computer will randomly determine the maximum possible prize each period.  
You will not be told the amount of the maximum prize, but it is the maximum amount you can 
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Step2: Information about the Maximum Possible Prize 
Gathering information allows you to find out more about the maximum prize in the current 
period. The blue buttons at the bottom of your screen let you pick the type of information you 
would like to know.   
Select from 256 Prizes: You get no additional information and select from all 256 prizes.   
Select from 128 Prizes: You learn if the maximum possible prize is in the first 128 prizes or the 
last 128 prizes.   
Select from 64 Prizes: You learn if the maximum possible prize is in the first set of 64 prizes, the 
second set of 64 prizes, the third set of 64 prizes, or the fourth set of 64 prizes. 
… 
Select from 1 Prize: You learn the maximum possible prize. 
In the screen shot above, we picked Select from 32 Prizes and we found out the maximum 
possible prize is in the 7th set of 32 prizes:  somewhere between 193 and 224.           
 Step 3: Solve Logic Puzzles 
To receive the information selected in Step 2, you have to solve some logic puzzles which work 
as follows.  A 3x3 table of images will be shown to you.  Each image has a particular shape, 
direction, size, color, border edge, and border corner.  Some of these characteristics will change 
from row to row, column to column, diagonally, or from corner to corner.  You have to identify 
the image that belongs in the lower right corner.  The blue buttons include information on how 
frequently people have successfully answered the required puzzles in a previous study.  Below 
is an example of a puzzle.  In this example, the shape changes row to row while the size changes 
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The better information you want to receive the harder the logic puzzles you have to solve.  
Typically, you have to correctly solve 2 puzzles.  One exception is that you have to solve 3 very 
difficult puzzles to Select from 1 Prize.  The other exception is that you only have to answer a 
single easy puzzle if you want to Select from 256 Prizes.  The blue buttons on your screen 
indicate how often people who have participated in this study before have been able to correctly 
solve the necessary puzzles.   
The computer will not tell you if you answer a logic puzzle correctly or not; all you will observe 
is the yellow range for the maximum possible prize if you solve the task correctly. If you do not 
solve the task correctly, the full set of 256 prizes will be yellow. 
Step 4: Picking a Prize 
Once you have obtained all of the information you want then you can pick a prize. 
To pick a prize you simple click on it.  If the prize you pick is less than or equal to the maximum 
possible prize then the prize you pick is added to your payoff. Otherwise you earn 0 for the 
period.   
In the example above we know the maximum possible prize is between 193 and 224.  Suppose 
you picked a prize of 199.  If the maximum prize was 211 then you would earn 199.  But if the 
maximum prize was 194 then you would earn 0. The maximum prize is not revealed.  You will 
simply see your prize turn green if you receive the prize and red if you do not.      
ATTENTION – TRADEOFF: You face a tradeoff in that better information helps you make 
better decisions about what prize to claim in a period but acquiring less accurate information 
enables you to claim more prizes during that phase of the study.  
ATTENTION - TIME PENALTY:  Your time will be reduced by 60 seconds (technically 60 seconds 
are added to your elapsed time) if you pick from the full set of 256 prizes and are 
unsuccessful.  This can occur either when you decide to Select from 256 Prizes because you 
did not try to get better information or when you tried for better information but did not 
correctly solve the required puzzles.  When all of the prizes are yellow when you pick a prize 
the time penalty is in play.   
 
Summary 
1. Each period the computer will determine the maximum possible prize.   
2. You can solve puzzles to get information about the maximum possible prize.  Better 
information requires you to solve more and harder puzzles. 
3. If you pick a prize less than or equal to the maximum possible prize then the prize you 
pick is added to your earnings.  Otherwise you earn 0 for the period.   
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General Instructions 
Page 5 of 5 
 
4. The faster you pick a prize the more periods you will have (but there is a 60 second 
penalty if you unsuccessfully pick from all 256 prizes). 
5. You will complete three paid phases, each of which lasts about 20 minutes.  You will be 
paid based upon your cumulative earnings in each of those phases. 
  
If you, have a question raise your hand.  Otherwise, you can press the start button to begin the 





Instructions for Treatment 1 
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The next phase of the study will count towards your payment. 
This phase is the same as the practice phase you did initially. 
 
1. The 256 prizes are just amounts 1, 2, 3, …., 255, 256 (as in the practice phase). 
 
2. Each period the maximum possible prize that you could claim is randomly determined and 
equally likely to be any of the show prize amounts (as in the practice phase).  
 
If you, have a question raise your hand.  Otherwise, you can press the start button to begin this paid 
phase of the study.  One you press start your time will begin and you cannot pause it.   
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Instructions for Treatment 2 
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The next phase of the study will count towards your payment. 
This phase is different from the practice phase you did initially. 
 
1. In most periods the prizes are 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, …., 25.5, 25.6, which is one-tenth of what they were 
in the practice phase.  However, every 11th period (that is in period 11, period 22, period 33, and 
so on) the prizes are 10, 20, 30, …., 2550, 2560, which is ten times what they were in the 
practice phrase.    
 
2. Each period the maximum possible prize that you could claim is randomly determined and 
equally likely to be any of the show prize amounts (as in the practice phase).  
 
If you, have a question raise your hand.  Otherwise, you can press the start button to begin this paid 
phase of the study.  One you press start your time will begin and you cannot pause it.    
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Instructions for Treatment 3 
Page 1 of 2 
 
The next phase of the study will count towards your payment. 
This phase is different from the practice phase you did initially. 
 
1. The 256 prizes are just amounts 1, 2, 3, …., 255, 256 (as in the practice). 
  
2. In the first period, the maximum possible prize that you could claim is randomly determined and 
equally likely to be any of the show prize amounts.  After that, in any period there is an 80% 
chance that the maximum possible prize does not change from one period to the next and only 





















Instructions for Treatment 3 





If you, have a question raise your hand.  Otherwise, you can press the start button to begin this paid 
















C Individual Results by Subject
(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 1 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 1
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 3 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 3
Figure A1: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 1 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 4 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 4
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 5 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 5
(e) Positive shocks - Sbj 9 (f) Negative shocks - Sbj 9
Figure A2: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 2 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 12 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 12
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 13 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 13
(e) Positive shocks - Sbj 16 (f) Negative shocks - Sbj 16
Figure A3: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 3 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 18 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 18
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 19 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 19
(e) Positive shocks - Sbj 20 (f) Negative shocks - Sbj 20
Figure A4: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 4 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 21 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 21
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 24 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 24
(e) Positive shocks - Sbj 25 (f) Negative shocks - Sbj 25
Figure A5: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 5 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 26 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 26
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 28 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 28
(e) Positive shocks - Sbj 29 (f) Negative shocks - Sbj 29
Figure A6: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 6 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 34 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 34
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 35 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 35
(e) Positive shocks - Sbj 36 (f) Negative shocks - Sbj 36
Figure A7: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 7 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 38 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 38
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 39 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 39
(e) Positive shocks - Sbj 40 (f) Negative shocks - Sbj 40
Figure A8: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 8 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
periods before the shock and the three periods after the shock are showed. All subjects in
Treatment 3.
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(a) Positive shocks - Sbj 42 (b) Negative shocks - Sbj 42
(c) Positive shocks - Sbj 60 (d) Negative shocks - Sbj 60
Figure A9: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO INCOME SHOCKS 9 - Average income, con-
sumption, and precision in the neighborhood of an income shock, centered at time 0. Two
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Chapter 3: Evaluating Iodiosyncratic Experimental Environments
1 Introduction
It well known that economics has come a long way since its inception as a formal and
distinct discipline. Indeed, the earlier economists – such as Adam Smith and his contempo-
raries – practiced their craft in a way quite different than modern economists. In the early
stages most economics, like other sciences, took the form of an abstract thought exercise.
In many respects, economics started as a philosophy rather than a science per se. That
is, most of the understanding of economic phenomena was based on empirical observations
from which economists made generalizations. These generalizations were then taken to be
the foundations for logical derivations that were explanations for ancillary phenomena.
Such was the case for both the physical sciences and the social sciences for quite a long
time. Obviously calculus and an avalanche of discoveries in the world of mathematics dra-
matically impacted the progress of physics and served to propel it forward at unprecedented
rates. The rapid progress of economics experienced a very similar accelerator effect when
mathematical rigor began to be incorporated. Economics now takes on a highly math-
ematized form where we start with a few fundamental assumptions, and then we derive
predictions after wrapping a model around the world in an attempt to explain it. These
predictions take the form of falsifiable hypotheses.
There are, generally speaking, two ways in which we approach the examination of these
hypotheses. Firstly, where the data are available, we “take the model to the data” and
employ various econometric techniques to test the ability of the model to accurately capture
what we observe in the real world. Secondly, we have the ability to test these hypotheses
with experiments.
Experimental techniques in economics and the social sciences take on two different forms:
field experiments and laboratory experiments. Both of these techniques have grown increas-
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ingly popular over the last six decades or so; and the level of sophistication, too, has in-
creased. This rise in sophistication is accompanied by a simultaneous rise in the complexity
and difficulty of implementation.
It is not surprising that the early days of experimental economics was very basic from a
technological perspective. Experiments were devised in such a way that the experiment could
be administered under the constraints at the time. Often experiments were administered
using paper and pencil. As the field has developed, the types of questions that researchers
have been taking to the laboratory to test have become increasingly demanding – not only
theoretically, but also from an technical implementation perspective.
The advent of computer technology has fundamentally changed the world, and economics
was not an exception. It has enabled economists to ask much more difficult questions,
build much more sophisticated models, and provide richer insight into the world around us.
However, when conducting these researchers are quickly confronted with a problem – as the
level of complexity of the model increases, so does the amount of resources required to either
attain a solution to the model or test the predictions of those models.
Economists have long used mathematical models to understand and explain economic
phenomena. As the types of questions being asked have become more challenging, the level
of sophistication of these models has increased as well. Because of the level of complexity
of these models, often analytical solutions thereof are difficult, if not impossible, to attain.
Numerical solutions methods have thus become a prominent subject in economics litera-
ture. Unsurprisingly, an important factor in the discussion is their costs – both in terms of
computational resources as well as the effort needed in order to actually write the code.
Taylor and Uhlig (1990) compare several different solution techniques for nonlinear rational-
expectation models, and as a result, they conclude that “researchers might want to be careful
not to rely blindly on the results of any chosen numerical solution method in applied work”
because there is such variance in the results from each. They also report the computation
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time for each of the methods, with the fastest reported being 20 seconds, and the longest
being 5 hours.
Parra-Alvarez (2013) also examines solution methods, except for solutions to dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Parra-Alvarez notes that analytical solutions
to DSGE models are only attainable “under very restrictive and economically uninteresting
assumptions.” Again, expansion of the complexity of these models and the relaxation of
assumptions causes analytical solutions to quickly become unobtainable, and therefore re-
quires the employment of numerical solutions. Finding that computation times can be as
much as 40 times slower than the simplest case considered, Parra-Alvarez concludes that
in order to find a good approximation, a good starting point for the numerical method is
necessary. Because this exercise alone requires a substantial amount of computation time, he
states that it is sufficient to undermine the viability of a some of the econometric methods
he examined.
Aruoba and Fernandez-Villaverde (2014) consider the issue of computation time along
a different dimension. Conditional upon the same code, they investigate the computation
speed of several of the most widely used coding languages, both within and outside of the
field of economics. They find that solutions can vary by up to 4 orders of magnitude merely
as a function of language differences, and this is without altering the algorithm used for the
testing to take advantage of idiosyncratic features of each of the languages. They also report
differences across operating systems used to run the codes.
It is clear that there is a trade off between results and the computation time, but there is
another factor that is potentially even more critical to the decision of which solution method
to utilize: the difficulty of implementation. This is consistently a topic of discussion in the
literature, and, unsurprisingly, a challenging input to measure. If the researcher has prior
experience in one coding language over another, switching to what may be a faster language
may not receive a sufficient return on investment in order to justify the time it would take
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to translate the algorithm.
Researchers in the field of experimental economics are confronted with an analogous
problem. Although computation time, per se, may not be of typical concern, the ability for
a given coding language or environment to accommodate increasingly complex experimental
setups is a very common issue. This also leads to the problem of implementation, and results
in the fundamental question: What coding language is best for a given experiment, and what
is the investment needed in order to accomplish the given ends? A search of the literature
yields no substantive prior work on this matter.
This paper seeks to enumerate the advantages and disadvantages of some of the most
commonly used environments for the deployment of experiments, and is structured as follows.
Section 2 discusses some of the interfaces that are available for implementing experiments.
In Section 3, I present two experimental interfaces that I developed along with comments
and insights garnered from experience with those unconventional languages and interfaces.
Section 4 presents a quantitative comparison between the two languages used to code the
interfaces presented in Section 3. Section 5 concludes.
2 Interfaces for Experimental Studies in Economics
One of the most substantial contributions to the experimental literature — and the disci-
pline at large — is the release of the freely available z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made
Economics Experiments) software environment (Fischbacher, 2007). For quite a long time
after its release, z-Tree became a sort of gold standard for experimental implementations.
The authors of the code constructed it such that the end users had to have little to no knowl-
edge of coding languages used to engineer a graphical user interface (GUI). Since it was first
published in 2007, it has been cited thousands of times as the environment in which exper-
imental economic studies have been conducted. z-Tree offered experimentalists something
that had not been previously available – a pre-made environment in which an experiment
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could be developed at an unprecedented rate. One of the most impactful features is that it
allows for subjects to quickly and anonymously interact with one another in the lab. This
was something that previously was extremely difficult to achieve. Timing, graphical displays,
and an intuitive way to control global variables are all features that make z-Tree particularly
appealing.
z-Tree is not without its faults, however. In particular, the two most characteristics that
precluded it from being the environment of choice in LeBlanc et al. (2016) is the fact that
“seconds” is the most granular unit of time in the environment’s movement between stages
and/or updating graphics. We had a specific demand on our graphics that required them to
be updated every 0.2 seconds (at maximum), which immediately made z-Tree a nonviable
solution. Further, z-Tree is not particularly powerful when it comes to rendering graphics
and can be relatively slow in that capacity. Even when attempting to use z-Tree at its fastest
– 1 second intervals – the demand on the graphics was too high. Additionally, there are a
very limited set of multimedia file types that z-Tree is able to consume: .jpg, .gif, .png, .bmp,
.wmv, .mpg, .avi, .wav, and .mp3, and it exclusively uses Windows Media Player to delver
video content. Several of these file formats, especially the audio and video, are outdated,
and some are only usable on Windows machines. With that in mind, another limitation of
z-Tree is that it is only able to be used on Windows machines. With alternative operating
systems such as Linux, Google Android, and Apple’s OSX and iOS gaining increasing share
of the operating system market, a nontrivial consideration is an experiment being able to be
deployed across a variety of devices.
Given that z-Tree has several rather substantial limitations. It is no surprise, then,
that over the years there have been several alternatives that have also emerged, such as
Redwood (Magnani et al., 2016), California Institute of Technology and UCLA’s Multistage,
and University of Anchorage Alaska’s Python Experimental Economics Toolkit (PEET).
While each of these (albeit not mutually exclusively) are able to provide some functionality
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that may have been unavailable in the z-Tree world, each of them have technical hurdles
and shortcomings of its own. While z-tree may be relatively painless to set up and use for
development, this is not necessarily the case with the others. Redwood requires an extensive
knowledge of HTML and Javascript and how it behaves on a server system. PEET requires
that the experimenter have a background in the Python coding language, which I have
found to be an uncommonly used coding language in the field of Economics in general, in
experiments in particular.
An experimentalist is not, of course, limited to these options. He or she always has the
option to engineer software specifically for one’s use case. The means by which this decision
is most optimally made is ultimately an economic decision. What are the specific functions
that the software needs to be able to perform for the experiment to address the research
questions? Does the researcher have a rigorous coding background, let alone a software
development background? If so, what is the “learning curve” in order to get an operational
experiment constructed in a timely fashion? If not, what is the cost of a software engineer
to complete the coding on one’s behalf?
3 Two Use Cases
The aforementioned is not an exhaustive list that a researcher must ask himself or herself
when deciding what route to take in the implementation of an experiment, but they are
certainly a few of the most impactful. In what follows, I discuss in detail specific needs for
two different experimental platforms, and some of those platforms’ strengths and weaknesses.
In providing some detail for the specific use cases that were encountered in this body of work,
I illuminate why those in particular were chosen. I also discuss the benefits associated with
each of them, as well as some of the most substantial challenges faced while developing the
associated experiments. Finally, for each I conclude with recommendations for how to make
an informed decision as to which environment is best for your experiment, and how to go
130
about developing an experiment efficiently and effectively.
3.1 Optimal Price Setting Using Javascript
Our price setting experiment was ultimately an extension of Magnani et al. (2016). It
was therefore reasonable to think that a possible solution for the shortcomings left by z-
Tree could be compensated for by the environment which they chose to use to administer
their experiment. Working in a new environment called Redwood, Magnani, et al. ran
their experiment using a tailored Javascript code. This seemed like a logical place to start,
and Ryan Oprea generously assisted in providing us with resources, codes, and contacts to
help get Redwood up and running at the University of Arkansas. Unfortunately, due to the
fact that it was a very new software environment, there was not a lot of documentation or
troubleshooting resources from which to draw understanding. Ultimately, after coordinating
with our own campus information technologists and others at U.C. Santa Barbara, we were
not able to get Redwood fully-functioning.
This does not speak to Redwood’s viability as a possible solution for implementing ex-
periments, but it does, however, underscore the extent to which technological problems can
substantially inhibit the ability of researchers to implement their experiments. After working
for several weeks to try to adapt what had already been done in Magnani et al. (2016), there
was no indication that the technical issues would be overcome in a timely fashion, which
culminated in a decision that needed to be made: How were we going to get software made
that had the functionality that we needed? The decision was finally made by myself to follow
suit with Magnani, et al. and use Javascript and HTML, but instead of within the Redwood
environment, the code was developed entirely independently by myself. This decision was
made with a strong assumption that it was a viable option based on the work of Magnani et
al., even though I personally had no prior experience with coding in HTML and Javascript.
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3.1.1 Experimental Design
The goal of our experiment was to test the underlying behavioral assumptions of the
commonly used price rigidity “menu cost” models. The interface was presented to the subject
in the form of a virtual pizzeria which sells its pizzas at a current set price. Subjects earned
real payoffs by fulfilling outstanding orders. To accomplish this, the subject needed to check
the boxes next to five ingredients that correspond to those in the order and “submit the
order” by clicking a button. (I will refer to this henceforth as “baking a pizza.”) If all of the
ingredients of the pizza are correct, then the subject will earn some profit.
Profit is determined by the difference between the current set price and the optimal price.
When the experiment initializes, the optimal price began to move according to a random
walk, with equal probability of moving up or down every 0.2 seconds. Profit was maximized
by selling the pizza at the optimal price, and it fell off according to an exponential decay.
The subject was free at any point in time to change the current set price to equal the optimal
price by entering an “update code,” which consisted of a entering a random five-number code.
The subjects had five minutes per treatment to accumulate as much profit as possible.
Figure 1 shows a screen shot of the experimental interface the subjects faced. The upper
left-hand corner shows the pane where the subject fulfilled orders. The five boxes at the top
correspond to the ingredients for that order and were populated randomly and independently,
meaning that a particular ingredient could appear more than once on a given order. The
columns below contain ten possible ingredients, and the sorting of these ingredients was
changed randomly for every order.
The lower left-hand corner of the screen was a pane where the subject could observe the
movement of the optimal price in real time and its relationship to the current set price. The
lower right-hand corner of the screen provided the subject with information regarding the
profit that could be earned if submitting a correct order at that moment in time, as well as
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total profits accumulated during the treatment thus far.
The upper right-hand pane was where the subject would enter the update code. The
five boxes containing the code were randomly populated with a number between 0 and 9,
inclusive. The columns below contained all ten of those numbers, and the sorting of these
columns were randomized in order to mirror the task of baking a pizza.
As a representation of level of effort for this experiment, altogether the price setting
experiment required approximately 4,440 lines of code for the main body of the experiment.
The instructions pages, transition pages, and final landing page where the summary of the
subjects’ performance required more than an additional 500 lines of code.
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Figure 1: A screenshot showing the user interface with which the subjects interacted.
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3.1.2 Learnings
There are two things that made this experiment relatively simple to implement: (1) there
was no need for subjects to interact with other subjects, and (2) there was no need to pass
information between windows. The most challenging component in this experiment was the
need to have the plot dynamically update at a very rapid refresh rate without it having
deleterious effects on the performance of the software. Because HTML and Javascript are
used ubiquitously for the development of webpages and other online platforms, it was known
that this coding environment was capable of addressing our needs. Further, we knew that it
was sufficient to support the work of Magnani, et al. Although their experiment was quite
a bit simpler in structure than ours, the most demanding facet was the fact that again the
graphics needed to be dynamic, fast, and light on hardware.
In this context, by far the most convenient aspect of HTML and Javascript is the ability
to use cascading style sheets (CSS). These enable the developer to code a parametrized
feature and use it in different cases. For instance, in 1, the ovals around the different panes
can be coded into a CSS, and then the colors, width, and height can be altered. This saves
a tremendous amount of coding efforts and reduces the code’s verbosity.
Another added benefit of using HTML and Javascript was the ease of deployment. There
are a lot of things that can make the deployment of codes out to a number of machines
somewhat problematic. When using software packages, it is essential to ensure that the
operating system, the hardware requirements, and even system administration rights are
all consistent with the needs of the program. Javascript and HTML are digestible and
deployable using nearly any common internet browser. Because these tend to already be
present on nearly every machine on a university campus, developing a code to be run in
that environment has a relatively few points of failure from a implementation perspective.
Additionally, developing with the aim of deploying to a browser such as enables experimenters
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to take experiments off of the conventional laboratory setting with rows of desktops to being
able to implement using alternative devices such as mobile phones or tablets.
3.2 Rational Inattention Using C#
The implementation of an experiment capable of examining the behavioral underpinnings
of rational inattention was much more complex — and challenging — than the price set-
ting experiment. Due to the need to have a fully customizable interface, a custom software
application was engineered using C# (“C sharp”). There are many different integrated de-
velopment environments (IDE) available at no cost, but arguably the most robust of these
is Microsoft Visual Studio, which was the IDE of choice for this research endeavor.
The structure of the experiment was aimed to most closely represent in a laboratory
setting the environment modeled in Tutino (2013). The general concept of the experiment
is as follows. The treatment begins with the subject receiving an income draw, i, from a
uniform distribution ranging from 1 to 256, inclusive. The subject then has the ability to
acquire a signal that gives them information as to the magnitude of that income level. The
precision or quality of this signal is determined by the successful completion task wherein
they solve logic puzzles. Successful completion yields a signal indicating a bin of precision
p that indicates a bin in which the subject’s income is located. The subject then has the
option to invest more time in order to get more precise information concerning their income,
or the subject may choose to consume an amount, c. The level of consumption maps to a
level of surplus, s, which is the quantity that determines the subjects actual payoff at the
end of the experiment. If the consumption level c is less than i, then the subject’s cumulative
potential payoff, ⇡, becomes (⇡ + s).
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3.2.1 Interface
As can be seen in Figure 2, the primary interface window consists of three separate panels.
The upper left panel contains information about the various signals available to be acquired
by the subject. Here a column indicates the precision level (0 for the easiest to acquire; 8 for
the most difficult), and another indicates the width of the signal associated with that level.
For example, a Precision 0 signal provides a trivial signal of 1-256. This signal is trivial
because it is known by the subject that his or her income has been drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution from [1,256]. A column is also provided to indicate the probability of
successfully obtaining that particular signal. These probabilities were determined empirically
by a number of calibration studies. Finally, a column indicating the number of puzzles that
must be solved and what difficulty they are on a scale from 0 to 6 was provided.
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Figure 2: A screenshot showing the primary user interface with which the subjects interacted.
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The panel in the lower left is the area where the subject decides his or her level of
consumption. In order to help the subject know their standing at any point in the experiment,
a box is displayed dynamically. If the subject needs to acquire a signal in order to consume, a
yellow box that says, “Please acquire a signal in order to attempt consumption is displayed.”
Upon the successful acquisition of a signal, the box is replaced by a green box that says,
“You are now ready to consume!” When this happens, the “Choose Consumption” button
also appears. The subject then will use the scroll bar to adjust the level of consumption
they would like to attempt to consume. Adjusting the scroll bar will indicate the level of
consumption and, in realtime, the associated level of surplus will also be displayed. Once the
preferred level of consumption is selected, the subject then clicks the “Choose Consumption”
button.
The panel to the lower right shows the subject their earned cumulative profit thus far in
the experiment. When the subject clicks “Choose Consumption,” if the subject has sufficient
income, the cumulative surplus box will indicate this successful consumption by increasing
by the appropriate amount, and the background color will turn green. In the event that the
subject does not have enough income to purchase the consumption, then the background
color of the box will turn red.
The upper right corner has a panel in which the subject may find information regarding
the current state of the experiment. It shows a timer for the current treatment’s duration,
and the period in which the subject is currently located.
In order to consume the subject must at least attempt a signal. This is done by solving
a logic puzzle developed by Civelli and Deck (2017). An example of one of these puzzles
may be seen in Figure 3. Unsuccessful attempts may not provide a signal, but the subject
may still attempt to consume at his or her will. However, a penalty on an attempt to
consume beyond one’s means was imposed. This was done for several reasons. First, it
accounts for the possibility that the subject could move through the puzzle task without
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any attempt to correctly answer. It could be imagined the the subject could set the chosen
level of consumption extremely low, thereby increasing the chances that he or she would be
successful at a consumption attempt. Doing this repeatedly would potentially exceed the
potential payoffs obtained by carefully answering the puzzles in order to ascertain the true
level of one’s income in order to maximize total consumption every period.
Figure 3: A screenshot showing the user interface in which the subjects solved puzzles in
order to obtain signals.
A period consists of the following.
1. Choose precision of signal to be attempted to acquire.
2. Answer the puzzles.
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3. If successful in answering the puzzles, a signal will be provided. If unsuccessful, no
signal will be provided. Here, the subject may choose to attempt to correctly solve the
same level of precision again (if failed) or to choose a higher precision level.
4. Once the signal that the subject has been acquired, the subject attempts consumption.
This process is called one “period,” and the subject is able to go though as many periods as
possible in the duration of the treatment, and there were a total of three treatments.
Again, as a metric to indicate level of effort, the main experiment window (Figure 2)
and all of its functionality consisted of approximately 3,110 lines of code. The logic puzzle
task shown in Figure 3 required an additional 5,650 lines of code, while the starting page, an
interactive walkthrough, and several pages of instructions required more than an additional
1,500. Altogether, the C# version of the Rational Inattention experiment well exceeded over
10,000 lines of code.
3.2.2 Learnings
Again, the needs for the rational inattention experiment were substantially more complex
than in the price setting experiement. The demand on the graphics was not nearly as high,
but the experiment was such that it needed multiple windows — or, forms — to pass
information to other forms. There are a number of ways to do this, such as using a SQL
database to store data from one form and using another forms to query that database to
retrieve relevant data. Similar functionality could also be achieve using simple flat files (e.g.,
CSV or text files) stored to local hardware, and then again using the program to read/write
again to that file in order to retrieve the data needed. Processes that require read/write
typically add unnecessary overhead, and, as a rule of thumb, might be best to avoid to
ensure stable performance of the program, not to mention efficient use of the hardware.
Although employing these methods by no means would have resulted in a program too bulky
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to operate properly, it would require a careful understanding of the timing and sequence of
events in order to ensure that the relevant data are being stored properly before the program
tries to read them from the database. One poorly-timed record could undermine the entire
experiment’s data acquisition, not to mention could actually cause the code to crash if the
data are essential to its operation.
Global variables can be a convenient way to deal with this need. Global variables can
allow parameters to be perpetuated throughout the application without need to actually
read/write the information intended to pass on from one form to another to disk. Of course,
typically these data need to be recorded, but because ultimately the information needed
to keep the experiment running are being maintained in real time in the background, the
recording of data can be thought of as passive, and therefore not a critical function for
making sure that the code is able to run without experiencing internal inconsistencies that
might jeopardize the functionality of the code.
Further challenges were encountered due to the level of interactiveness desired for the
application. Instructions that explained the behavior of the application in order to ensure
that subjects understood the problem they were facing made the logic in the background
extremely complex to code and very tedious to debug. Further, having a dynamic interface
that only allowed certain actions or displays under certain conditions served to add to the
points of failure in the code.1 These complexities also make it difficult to consider “lines of
code” as an accurate representation of the amount of effort that went into development. The
operations to change the application’s performance, behavior, and displays based on decisions
that the subject was making did not only require additional coding, but the implementation
of the logic was extremely complex and required a great deal of attention to detail. An
extremely important lesson was learned here: There is merit to the old adage “Perfection is
1A sample of the part of the instructions prepared for this version of the experiment are included in the
experiment as a means to demonstrate just how complex the application became.
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the enemy of the good.” It is prudent to remember that while some sophisticated features
might be ideal, sometimes that comes with a substantial cost, which in this case materialized
in time to develop and a tremendous amount of points of failure making the debugging process
extremely difficult.
4 Performance Comparisons
From a technical perspective, the best way to decide on the language to use for an ex-
periment is dependent on what functions exactly the interface needs to be able to do. It is
important to ensure that the end product will not be too slow or unstable to actually be
able to use to collect data. Thus, having an understanding of the computational resources
required for certain tasks is very useful. I have taken three operations that are common in
experimental applications and executed them in both environments that I have implemented
experiments, as well as in z-Tree for comparison purposes. These three operations are image
loading/rendering, real time plotting, and data storage. As can be seen in Table 1, I find
that for each operation, either C# or HTML/Javascript is clearly better from a computa-
tional resource perspective. For image loading and rendering, I find that between the three
environments, one must choose to optimize either memory consumption or timing.
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Table 1: Performance metrics for three tasks across two different coding environments.
Task HTML/Javascript C# z-Tree
RAM Time [ms] RAM Time [ms] RAM Time [ms]
Image Loading 435KB 311 1.3MB 0.114 1.8MB N/A
Realtime Plotting 4.4 MB N/A 7.6MB N/A N/A N/A
Data Storage2 N/A 0.298 N/A 3.8 N/A < 1
Figure 4: A screenshot showing showing Visual Studio’s diagnostic tools.
Data for the C# application performance were obtained using the native code evaluation
tools in Microsoft Visual studio (part of which shown in Figure 4 and using custom-coded
timing mechanisms. Data for the performance of the HTML and Javascript were obtained
using Google Chrome’s Developer Tools (see Figure 5 for an example as to what these tools
look like), which is an industry standard way to evaluate a program or processes. Evaluations
144
for z-Tree’s performance were used by custom coding in global timing variables and Window’s
Resource Monitor (see Figure 6).
Figure 5: A screenshot showing one of the panes in Chrome’s Developer Tools.
4.1 Image Loading
Image loading is an extremely common function necessary for the administration of ex-
periments. One could imagine a case where there would be the need for a very large number
images to be read sequentially, so understanding demand on local memory is important to
ensure that the application or machine does not crash. Further, if the refresh rate needs to be
at a certain cadence, knowing the read time required for a given language is also imperative.
For each language I wrote code to read in two images, one of file size 25KB with dimensions
of 610px ⇥ 410px and one of file size 20KB with dimensions of 480px ⇥ 420px. The C#
application was already launched when it would load an image. Upon clicking of a button,
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Figure 6: A screenshot showing the Windows Resource Monitor utility.
a new window would open, and it would read the images upon initialization. To mimic this,
a simple “launch page” was coded in HTML with a simple button on the page. Clicking this
button would launch a new tab and the images would be read in as it opened. This operation
was mirrored closely in z-Tree by initially launching a “zLeaf,” which acts as a “launch page"
before the experiment is started, which is equivalent to clicking the aforementioned buttons
in C# and HTML.
I find that on average, reading in both of these images takes approximately 311 millisec-
onds in HTML using the Google Chrome browser, whereas the same operation took 0.114
milliseconds in C#. It was very difficult to measure the rendering speed using z-Tree. One
may only call the backend timestamp using a “program,” and a “program” may only be ex-
ecuted at the beginning of a stage. Therefore, it was only possible to get that metric by
transitioning into another stage, which cannot happen any more quickly than 1 second. How-
ever, it is worth noting that as soon as the stage begins, the images are virtually immediately
present.
With respect to memory, I find that Google Chrome requires only 435KB of memory
while C# requires 1.3MB. It is important to note here that in Google Chrome, as one opens
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the new window and closes it, the local memory in the application resets automatically.
That is, monitoring memory from the “launch page,” the new window only causes a brief
increase in memory usage, and then will reset (often referred to as “garbage collecting” by
developers). In the C# application, however, I find that the memory does not reset3 Image
loading in z-Tree absorbed the most resources with a total of 1.8MB, but once moving to a
new “stage,” the memory was reset automatically.
4.2 Real Time Plotting
Real time graphics are often a desired component to experiment, but as already discussed,
a lot of coding environments in which most experiments are developed are not well suited
to tackle such a task. z-Tree, for instance, is not capable of meeting this requirement, so
therefore it was not possible to evaluate it. Both HTML and C#, however, are well-equipped
for this; but knowing how each handles it from a load bearing perspective is critical. To
evaluate the HTML use case, I used the same code that was used in the experiment in
LeBlanc et. al (2014). Code specific for this task did not already exist in C#, so I developed
a simple application to draw a line across the screen, using similar logic to that in the HTML
code.
The Chrome developer tools include the Allocation Profiler, which allows you to record
a session of a webpage and to analyze various dimensions of its performance as a function of
time. Started the realtime plotting and recorded several profiles for 5 minutes in duration.
I was then able to isolate the memory burden due to the plotting functions, and this con-
sistently came out to be 4.4 MB. The Diagnostic Tools in Visual studio are quite different
from, but the developer is still able to view the distribution of memory as a function of time.
However, because there is an actual application running, there is intrinsically memory being
3While it is certainly possible to have the code clean its memory upon the close of the window, I have
not implemented that functionality in order to make the operations of the codes be as close to one another
as possible. Since I did not specfically code for Chrome to reset, I chose not to do this in C# either.
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consumed by that process. To account for this, I recorded the memory usage before the line
began to be drawn and then let the program run for 5 minutes. I found that the difference
in memory usage that can attributed to the drawing process to be 7.6MB.
4.3 Storing Data
Saving data is an essential part of any experiment. How to construct the output is crit-
ical in the development process, and although it is not a glamorous aspect, improper data
engineering could result in a number of problems, such as the inability to test various hy-
potheses that may arise once the experimental data have been collected4. On the other hand,
careful consideration of how to record output can even enable researchers to reconstruction
of a subject’s behavior throughout an entire experiment. But with the increasing complexity
of experiments also contributes to an increase in the amount of data that will need to be
stored, and if there are a significant number of actions to be recorded in rapid succession, it
is important to understand the timing capabilities of how data are recorded.
I measured the time it took for Chrome to write a line to memory by inserting timing
functions in the code. I found that on average, Chrome could write a line of data to memory
in 0.298 milliseconds. Using a similar method to time it takes C# to write a line of data to
memory, I found that it took no measurable amount of time. Writing a line to memory and
storing the data at the conclusion of the experiment is not the only way to record data. It
is common to have a program create a blank text file and then write lines to it when certain
events occur. Using C#, this approach takes an average of 3.8 milliseconds to accomplish,
4The fundamentals of the data engineering that is required to properly record an experiment is not the
subject of this section, so I will no expound upon it in great detail here. However, I would encourage anyone
constructing an experiment to think very carefully about every action that the subjects will be making
and to consider how the codes that will be consuming the recorded data, and even possibly consult with a
professional data engineer before collecting data. This can preempt a number of problems, two of which are
most substantial being: (1) not being able to test hypotheses because sufficiently granular data were not
recorded or were not recorded properly, and (2) it will reduce a great deal of coding necessary to reconstruct
and clean data after the experiment is concluded.
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while z-Tree was able to write data to a text file in less than a millisecond5 To the best of my
knowledge, HTML and Javascript are not well equipped for this approach, instead relying
on outputting the data as a whole from memory once it has all been collected.
5 Conclusion
It is no small feat to publish a paper, and experimental economics is not exception.
From the formulation of hypotheses, to discerning how to properly test those hypotheses
with live subjects in a laboratory setting, to the data analysis and writing, it is an enormous
undertaking, as any experimentalist may attest. The implementation of all of those ideas
is often a stage that gets very little attention once the paper has come together, but it is a
nontrivial portion to the entire process. Knowing which environment is most suitable to your
experiment’s needs can not only save time and a lot of labor, but it can make the capabilities
the researcher is able to implement richer and more robust.
The purpose of this work is to present two very different use cases and to provide insight
to the strengths and weaknesses for each of the implementation methods. Further, this
work finds a place in the literature alongside many other works written to help economists
understand the computational advantages and limitations for some commonly used processes
in the field of experimental economics. It is to be expected that there is not a “silver bullet”
that solves the needs of every experiment, but the data presented here can help guide future
researchers to a platform that is most suitable to their needs.
5It should be noted that z-Tree’s backend timing resolution is limited one millisecond.
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A Rational Inattention Instructions
This is w
here you can find inform
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about the signals you can acquire, including 
difficulty level and probability of answ
ering correctly.
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nce you have chosen a signal 
precision and com
pleted the task, 
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e! You are 
able to consum
e whether or not you 
actually acquired a signal.
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appears here.
Use the scroll bar to choose your 
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ption level and the 
corresponding potential payoff.
After acquiring a signal, you are allowed to also 
choose to acquire a signal of higher precision. You 
are not able to choose a signal of lower precision.
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signal, if you do attem
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greater than your incom
e, you w
ill 
not incur a penalty.
156
Conclusion
The purpose of this body of work has been to investigate the behavioral foundations of
two of the most prominent macroeconomic models. Learnings from these experiments also
provided insight into the advancement of experimental economics over the last few decades
and to what increasing expectations might look like in the future.
Chapter 1 provides evidence that while subjects in general understand that state-dependence
is the optimal approach for making decisions with regard to updating prices, they also find
it di cult to ascertain a precise threshold. Chapter 2 provides experimental evidence that
subjects exhibit behavior explicitly predicted by the rational inattention model, including
adjusting the amount of information processed according to the underlying economics envi-
ronment and responding asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks in income. Finally,
Chapter 3 provides quantifiable metrics by which experimenters are able to understand the
resources that common tasks require from a computational perspective. Moreover, insight
is given into how the advancement in sophistication of experimental economics increasingly
puts demands on economists from a software engineering perspective, very much akin to the
way that the necessity for numerical methods for solving complex models put demand on
economists from a computer science perspective.
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